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LIVING ORIGINALISM
THOMAS B. COLBY†
PETER J. SMITH††
ABSTRACT
Originalists routinely argue that originalism is the only coherent
and legitimate theory of constitutional interpretation. This Article
endeavors to undermine those claims by demonstrating that, despite
the suggestion of originalist rhetoric, originalism is not a single,
coherent, unified theory of constitutional interpretation, but is rather a
disparate collection of distinct constitutional theories that share little
more than a misleading reliance on a common label. Originalists
generally agree only on certain very broad precepts that serve as the
fundamental underlying principles of constitutional interpretation:
specifically, that the “writtenness” of the Constitution necessitates a
fixed constitutional meaning, and that courts that see themselves as
empowered to give the Constitution some avowedly different meaning
are behaving contrary to law. Originalists have been able to achieve
agreement on these broad underlying principles, but they have often
viewed as unduly narrow and mistaken the understanding held by the
original originalists—the “framers” of originalism, if you will—as to
how those principles must be put into action. And originalists disagree
so profoundly amongst themselves about how to effectuate those
underlying principles that over time they have articulated—and
continue to articulate—a wide array of strikingly disparate, and
mutually exclusive, constitutional theories. In this regard, originalists
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have followed a living, evolving approach to constitutional
interpretation.
Our account of originalism’s evolution—and of the extensive
disagreement among originalists today—undermines originalists’
normative claims about the superiority of their approach. Originalists’
claims about the unique and exclusive legitimacy of their theory—that
originalism self-evidently represents the “correct” method of
constitutional interpretation—founder when one considers that
originalists themselves cannot even begin to agree on what their
“correct” approach actually entails. And their claims that originalism
has a unique ability to produce determinate and fixed constitutional
meaning, and thus that only originalism properly treats the
Constitution as law and properly constrains judges from reading their
own values into the Constitution, stumble when one considers the
rapid evolution and dizzying array of versions of originalism; because
each version has the potential to produce a different constitutional
“meaning,” the constitutional meaning that a committed originalist
judge would find turns out to be anything but fixed. As originalism
evolves, the constitutional meanings that it produces evolve along with
it. Today’s originalists not only reach results markedly different from
those originalists reached thirty years ago, but also produce widely
divergent results amongst themselves. Judges committed to the
originalist enterprise thus have significant discretion to choose
(consciously or subconsciously) the version of originalism that is
most likely to dictate results consistent with their own preferences. As
such, originalism suffers from the very flaws that its proponents have
identified in its alternatives.
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INTRODUCTION
For the last several decades, the primary divide in American
constitutional theory has been between those theorists who label
1
themselves as “originalists” and those who do not. It is widely
understood that the side that does not embrace originalism is
populated by proponents of a vast array of constitutional theories. To
many proponents of originalism, the staggering diversity of these
alternative approaches—which Justice Scalia and other originalists
2
dismiss as nonoriginalism or, even more derisively (in their minds),
3
“living” constitutionalism —is evidence of their collective inferiority.
Nonoriginalists, Justice Scalia explains, can reach “agreement on
4
nothing except what is the wrong approach.” It takes a theory to beat
a theory, he argues, but “it is hard to discern any emerging consensus
5
among the nonoriginalists as to what this might be.” The “glaring
defect of Living Constitutionalism,” he contends, “is that there is no
agreement, and no chance of agreement, upon what is to be the
6
guiding principle of the evolution” of constitutional meaning.
This assertion trades implicitly on the notion that “originalism”
represents a single, coherent constitutional theory, against which are
arrayed the disparate nonoriginalist alternatives. Originalist rhetoric
paints a powerful picture of originalism as a consistent, coherent

1. “Originalism” is a murky term, as this Article seeks to explain. But at its core, it treats
“the discoverable meaning of the Constitution at the time of its initial adoption as authoritative
for purposes of constitutional interpretation in the present.” Keith E. Whittington, The New
Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 599 (2004).
2. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 854 (1989); see
also Rebecca L. Brown, History for the Non-Originalist, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 69, 69
(2003) (“[Non-originalists] have long borne the stigma of identification by negative
appellation.”); Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the
Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1126 n.42 (2003) (“Non-originalism
seems best defined, derivatively, in contradistinction to originalism.”).
3. See William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693,
694–97 (1976); Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION 3, 38, 41–47 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1998).
4. Scalia, supra note 2, at 855.
5. Id.; accord Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611,
617 (1999) (“It takes a theory to beat a theory and, after a decade of trying, the opponents of
originalism have never congealed around an appealing and practical alternative.”).
6. Scalia, supra note 3, at 44–45; accord Scalia, supra note 2, at 862–63 (“I also think that
the central practical defect of nonoriginalism is fundamental and irreparable: the impossibility
of achieving any consensus on what, precisely, is to replace original meaning, once that is
abandoned.”).
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7

theory that has stood the test of time while countless other
convoluted theories—reverse-engineered by hopeless activists who
start with desired results and try unsuccessfully to reason backward to
a principled theory—have come and gone, all so plainly flawed that
they are unable to attract adherents. To hear many originalists tell it,
the fact that all of the smart and talented nonoriginalists have failed
to come up with “the” alternative to originalism after decades of
desperately trying—have failed, that is, to develop a theory that is
coherent and compelling enough for the other nonoriginalists to rally
8
around—suggests that no such theory is possible. Originalism, they
insist, is the only coherent method of constitutional interpretation. As
Raoul Berger puts it, because originalism has been a consistent
theory of constitutional interpretation, whereas nonoriginalists
“parade[] as many theories as writers” and there is little “consensus
9
among
activists
about
a
theory
of
interpretation,”
“[o]riginalism . . . justifies itself by the falseness of the beliefs that
10
oppose it.”
It is not just the rhetorical attraction of originalism, but also its
normative force, that to a substantial degree turns on there being one,
consistent originalist approach. To its proponents, originalism is not
simply the only coherent approach, but also the only legitimate
approach. Normative defenses of originalism are generally based on
the notion that the predictability, determinacy, and coherence of the
originalist approach both respects law and constrains judges. Those
defenses typically begin by noting that originalism, unlike other
approaches to constitutional interpretation, accords to the
Constitution fixed and determinate meaning. This determinacy is
essential, originalists maintain, to preserving the Constitution as a
form of law in a democratic society; after all, “[w]hen we speak of
‘law,’ we ordinarily refer to a rule that we have no right to change
except through prescribed procedures,” such as those in Article V of
7. See, e.g., Edwin Meese III, Toward a Jurisprudence of Original Intent, 11 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 5, 11 (1988) (describing originalism as an “enduring standard”).
8. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 5, at 617 (“The inability of the most brilliant and creative
legal minds to present a plausible method of interpretation that engendered enough confidence
to warrant overriding the text . . . make[s] . . . originalism much more attractive.”).
9. Raoul Berger, New Theories of “Interpretation”: The Activist Flight from the
Constitution, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 10 (1986).
10. Id. at 44 (quoting Raymond Aron, Pensées, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1983, at E19); see also
Raoul Berger, Original Intent and Boris Bittker, 66 IND. L.J. 723, 754–55 (1991) (arguing that a
“great merit of originalism” is “that it is a ‘simple’ concept” and noting that, by contrast,
“[n]onoriginalists . . . cannot unite on a single alternative but struggle in a welter of theories”).
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11

the Constitution. Originalists often assert that the propriety of
originalism follows naturally from the very fact that the Constitution
is a form of law; originalism, they say, is “almost self-evidently
12
correct” and “so obvious that it should hardly need a name, let alone
13
a defense.” Responding directly to the long-standing problem of the
countermajoritarian difficulty—that is, the concern that judicial
review allows unelected, unaccountable judges to thwart the will of
14
democratically elected legislatures —originalists further contend that
the determinacy provided by reliance on constitutional text, or at
least on some objective guidepost for the fixed meaning of the
constitutional text, is essential to constraining judges’ ability to
impose their own views under the guise of constitutional
15
interpretation.
As a result, originalists insist, originalism is not merely a
legitimate method of constitutional interpretation, but rather is the
only legitimate interpretive approach, and the only alternative to
“judicial activism.” Prominent originalists have, for some time now,
smugly declared that “there is a single, ‘true’ method of constitutional
16
interpretation,” and that “[o]ther approaches to interpretation are
17
simply wrong.” Any form of constitutional interpretation other than
originalism “must end in constitutional nihilism and the imposition of
18
the judge’s merely personal values on the rest of us.”

11. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE
LAW 143 (1990); see also OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ORIGINAL
MEANING JURISPRUDENCE: A SOURCEBOOK 3 (1987).
12. Lino A. Graglia, “Interpreting” the Constitution: Posner on Bork, 44 STAN. L. REV.
1019, 1020 (1992).
13. Steven G. Calabresi, Op-Ed., The Right Judicial Litmus Test, WALL ST. J., Oct. 1, 2007,
at A23.
14. See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16–23 (1962) (describing the countermajoritarian
difficulty).
15. See Barry Friedman, The Turn to History, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 928, 943 (1997) (reviewing
LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM (1996)) (noting originalism’s
promise to solve the countermajoritarian difficulty).
16. Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 2, at 1129; see also id. at 1121 (arguing that the
“interpretive project of determining the original public meaning of the Constitution” is “the
only truly legitimate approach to the interpretation of the Constitution as a legal document”).
17. Gary Lawson, On Reading Recipes . . . and Constitutions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1823, 1834
(1997) (emphasis added).
18. Robert H. Bork, Styles in Constitutional Theory, 26 S. TEX. L.J. 383, 387 (1985).
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Critics of originalism have sought to undermine these assertions
19
by questioning the legitimacy of originalism, or by seeking to
articulate alternative interpretive theories that can lay claim to
20
coherence and legitimacy. But they have for the most part accepted
uncritically the characterization of originalism as a coherent,
monolithic theory that stands in marked contrast to the mishmash of
21
divergent theories on the nonoriginalist side of the divide.
This Article argues that what both originalists and
nonoriginalists alike have generally failed to appreciate is that this
characterization is unfounded. In fact, just as with nonoriginalism,
there is profound internal disagreement on the originalist side of the
22
line. A review of originalists’ work reveals originalism to be not a
single, coherent, unified theory of constitutional interpretation, but
rather a smorgasbord of distinct constitutional theories that share
little in common except a misleading reliance on a single label. The
image of a monolithic theory standing tall and firm, deflecting

19. See, e.g., Ethan J. Leib, The Perpetual Anxiety of Living Constitutionalism, 24 CONST.
COMMENT. 353, 354 (2007) (questioning whether “the Constitution and its original principles”
are binding); Jed Rubenfeld, The Moment and the Millennium, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1085,
1105 (1998) (“Constitutionalism cannot survive when squeezed into a jurisprudence of a
particular past moment, for it then lacks any account of its own legitimate authority, its own
supremacy over the popular will of the present moment.”). See generally Daniel A. Farber, The
Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1085, 1095–96 (1989)
(explaining that originalism is chiefly criticized for being “too static . . . to keep the Constitution
up to date with changing times”).
20. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional
Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1192–94 (1987) (presenting a “constructivist coherence
theory” of constitutional interpretation).
21. Others have on occasion noted the basic point that, as Christopher Eisgruber once
aptly put it, “[o]riginalism comes in a bewildering variety of colors and flavors.” CHRISTOPHER
L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 26 (2001); see also, e.g., Mitchell N.
Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 9–16 (2009) (arguing that “literally
thousands of discrete theses can plausibly claim to be originalist”); Martin S. Flaherty, The Most
Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1812 (1996) (“If ever a term muddied as much as it
clarified, ‘originalism’ is it.”). But these observations have not been developed as the basis for
an independent critique of originalism. Our endeavor here is to develop and illustrate this point
in detail, and to derive from it a conclusion that others have missed: that the very existence of
this discord substantially undermines the normative claims upon which originalism is typically
based.
22. Indeed, the line that separates originalists from nonoriginalists itself is hazy at best.
Few nonoriginalists ignore the original meaning, see Michael C. Dorf, Integrating Normative and
Descriptive Constitutional Theory: The Case of Original Meaning, 85 GEO. L.J. 1765, 1766
(1997), and plenty of originalists are willing to accept interpretations of the Constitution that
depart from the original meaning, see, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, The Supreme Court in Bondage:
Constitutional Stare Decisis, Legal Formalism, and the Future of Unenumerated Rights, 9 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 155, 186 (2006).
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countless hapless attempts to knock it down, is inaccurate. The more
accurate picture is one of a collection of rapidly evolving theories,
constantly reshaping themselves in profound ways in response to
devastating critiques, and not infrequently splintering further into
multiple, mutually exclusive iterations.
Part I explains that, in a relatively short period of time,
originalism has evolved dramatically—indeed, so dramatically that
the brand of originalism advanced by some of its most prominent
defenders today would be virtually unrecognizable to those in
originalism’s vanguard in the 1970s and 1980s. More important,
contrary to the suggestion of its proponents—for whom there is only
originalism and everything else—there are today countless variations
of originalism, and the differences among them are sometimes so
stark that it is difficult to treat them as one coherent interpretive
23
methodology. The original “jurisprudence of original intention”
slowly gave way to one of original meaning, determined by reference
to the understanding—held by either the drafters, those who voted in
state ratification conventions, or the general public, depending upon
whom you asked—of the relevant provision at the time of its
adoption. And from there, originalist theory gradually shifted again,
to a jurisprudence of objective textual meaning. Today, pressing that
theory to its logical extreme, several of the most prominent academic
proponents of originalism dismiss not only the original intention of
the Framers but also the actual original understanding of the Framing
generation. Instead, they seek to determine how the words of the
Constitution “would have been understood by a hypothetical,
objective, reasonably well-informed reader of those words and
phrases, in context, at the time they were adopted, and within the
24
political and linguistic community in which they were adopted.” In
the meantime, other prominent originalists who also claim to rely on
original textual meaning have recast the theory in very different
terms, as one that boldly empowers the judiciary to protect libertarian
or even progressive visions of constitutional liberty. These various
current forms of originalism have almost nothing in common with
each other, or with the original originalism, except their selfconscious adoption of the same label. Infighting among originalists

23. Edwin Meese III, U.S. Attorney Gen., Address Before the D.C. Chapter of the
Federalist Society Lawyers Division (Nov. 15, 1985), in OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, supra note
11, at 96.
24. Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 2, at 1132 (emphasis added).

COLBY & SMITH IN FINAL

246

10/6/2009 6:28:37 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 59:239

has reached a fevered pitch, and it is not limited to disagreements
about how the theory is properly applied to particular legal questions;
rather, it concerns the very nature of the theory itself.
In Part II, we analogize originalism’s evolution to living
constitutionalism. Originalists, who have long criticized the notion of
a living constitution, have themselves followed a living, evolving
approach to constitutional interpretation. That is to say, originalists’
understanding of the relationship among originalism’s current
meaning, its original meaning, and its underlying principles is similar
to living constitutionalists’ understanding of the relationship among
the Constitution’s current meaning, its original meaning, and its
underlying principles.
It is not our objective here to criticize originalists for continually
refining their approach. Indeed, any rigorous theory must be capable
of adaptation in the quest for perfection. But because the rhetorical
and normative defenses of originalism—in whatever variation—turn
so substantially on the claims that originalism is the only theoretically
coherent and legitimate approach to constitutional interpretation, it is
notable that it has become virtually impossible today to define what
exactly originalism entails. With unintended irony, originalism has
become something of a moving target, evolving from speech to
speech, opinion to opinion, and law review article to law review
article. Justice Scalia is perhaps correct when he argues that “it is not
25
very helpful to tell a judge to be a ‘nonoriginalist.’” But the
proliferation of competing models of originalism suggests that it is
also increasingly unhelpful to tell a judge to be an originalist. The
very notion of originalism itself has become indeterminate.
Part III of this Article argues that this state of affairs has
important implications for originalism’s normative defense.
Originalists regularly advance at least three normative claims about
the superiority of their approach. They contend: (1) that their
methodology is the only theoretically coherent approach to
constitutional interpretation; (2) that, because their approach accords
to the Constitution a fixed and determinate meaning based on the
document’s text, it is the only legitimate approach to constitutional
interpretation—that is, the only approach that is consistent with the
Constitution’s status as law and the judiciary’s role in a democratic
society; and (3) (with perhaps less frequency today) that their

25. Scalia, supra note 2, at 855.
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approach is uniquely promising for constraining the ability of judges
to impose their own views under the guise of constitutional
interpretation. We explain that the diversity in and evolution of
originalist thought undermine these three claims. If even originalists
cannot agree about what originalism is and what it entails, then how
can originalism be uniquely coherent and self-evidently correct? And
because different versions of originalism focus on different historical
criteria—and, as a result, frequently produce different constitutional
meanings—how can originalists maintain that originalism is uniquely
determinate, and thus uniquely consistent with law and democracy?
Finally, when one recognizes that the diversity of originalist theories
allows originalist judges to pick and choose among the various strands
of originalism from case to case to reach results that accord with their
personal policy preferences, one is left to question the assertion that
originalism is uniquely resistant to judicial activism. Indeed, as Part
III explains, originalists can and often do move from one version of
originalism to another as they decide different issues, thus allowing
them to reach results that they personally prefer, all the while
claiming (and likely mistakenly believing) that they are being guided
by nothing more than the external constraint of history. For these
reasons, the diversity of originalist theories undermines the very
normative claims that tie those theories together.
I. ORIGINALISM’S EVOLUTION
A. The Shifting Hub of Originalism
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, frustration among
conservatives with the sweeping decisions of the Warren Court led
critics to insist that the Constitution be interpreted to give effect to
26
the intent of the Framers. In his confirmation hearings in 1971, for
instance, soon-to-be-Justice Rehnquist promised that he would not
“disregard the intent of the framers of the Constitution and change it
27
to achieve a result that [he] thought might be desirable for society.”
These were the origins of the modern originalist movement.
26. For example, Senator Sam Ervin asked Thurgood Marshall in the latter’s confirmation
hearings, “Is not the role of the Supreme Court simply to ascertain and give effect to the intent
of the framers of this Constitution and the people who ratified the Constitution?” Whittington,
supra note 1, at 599–600.
27. Id. at 600 (quoting Nominations of William H. Rehnquist and Lewis F. Powell, Jr.:
Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong. 19 (1971) (statement of Sen.
McClellan, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary)).
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When scholars like Raoul Berger and Robert Bork, and political
and judicial figures like Attorney General Edwin Meese III and thenJustice Rehnquist, began to compose scholarly monographs
articulating an intellectual defense of originalism in the 1970s and
1980s, they repeated and developed the notion that the proper
meaning of the Constitution is the meaning originally intended by the
Framers. Meese insisted upon a “jurisprudence of original intention”
28
that focused upon “the original intent of the Framers.” Rehnquist
demanded allegiance to the “language and intent” of the “framers of
29
the Constitution.” Bork insisted that “original intent is the only
30
legitimate basis for constitutional decisionmaking.” And Berger
decreed that any constitutional interpretive theory other than one
grounded in “original intention” amounted to nothing more than a
31
“judicial power to revise the Constitution.”
The theory of original intent was met with savage criticism,
focusing most prominently on two fundamental weaknesses. First, it is
nearly impossible to ascertain a single collective intent of a large
group of individuals, each of whom may have had different
32
intentions. Second, original intention is a self-defeating philosophy,
insofar as much of the historical evidence suggests that the Framers in
fact intended for future generations not to interpret the Constitution
according to their intent—thus requiring the paradoxical conclusion
that the only way to follow the intent of the Framers is not to follow
33
the intent of the Framers.
Largely in response to these devastating critiques, originalists
shifted the focus of their theory from the original intent of the
28. Meese, supra note 23, at 96–97.
29. Rehnquist, supra note 3, at 694–97.
30. Robert H. Bork, The Constitution, Original Intent, and Economic Rights, 23 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 823, 823 (1986).
31. RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 364 (1977); see also, e.g., Earl Maltz, Some New Thoughts on an
Old Problem—The Role of the Intent of the Framers in Constitutional Theory, 63 B.U. L. REV.
811, 811–12 (1983) (“[J]udges should be guided by the intent of the Framers of the relevant
constitutional provisions.”).
32. See, e.g., Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L.
REV. 204, 209–22 (1980).
33. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 885, 907 (1985). Powell’s conclusion was that the “original intent” favored by the Framing
generation was in fact an inquiry into “the ‘intentions’ of the sovereign parties to the
constitutional compact, as evidenced in the Constitution’s language and discerned through
structural methods of interpretation; it did not refer to the personal intentions of the framers or
of anyone else.” Id. at 948.
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Framers to the original meaning of the Constitution. As Justice Scalia,
who led the “campaign to change the label from the Doctrine of
34
Original Intent to the Doctrine of Original Meaning,” explained,
originalists began to seek “the original meaning of the text, not what
35
the original draftsmen intended.” Notwithstanding his central role in
the original movement in favor of original intent, Judge Bork quickly
36
joined that campaign.
The conventional wisdom holds that this was the watershed
37
transition in originalist thought. Of course, this monumental shift
alone substantially undermines the self-image of originalism as a
single, coherent theory. Yet the inconsistency of originalism—the
incoherence of the movement—runs much deeper. And it always
38
has.
Even in the early days of “original intent” originalism, there was
internal disagreement about the proper focus of the inquiry. The
“intent of the Framers” was a misleading abstraction that implied a
degree of agreement that was not really there. Just who were the
“Framers” whose intentions mattered: the men who drafted the text
of the Constitution and agreed upon it at the Philadelphia
convention, or the men whose ratification votes at the subsequent
34. Antonin Scalia, Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, Address Before the
Attorney General’s Conference on Economic Liberties (June 14, 1986), in OFFICE OF LEGAL
POLICY, supra note 11, at 106.
35. Scalia, supra note 3, at 38. As one of us has previously written,
This redirected focus on original meaning, rather than original intent, ostensibly
avoids both the problem of determining the collective intent of the numerous
Framers (the Framers may have had many reasons for enacting it, but the text
nonetheless had only one meaning) and the problem of self-defeat (much of the
historical evidence that was mustered to undermine the reliance on original intent
actually supports the reliance on original meaning by suggesting that the Framers
believed that the original meaning of the text, rather than the original intent of the
drafters, would control future constitutional interpretation).
Thomas B. Colby, The Federal Marriage Amendment and the False Promise of Originalism, 108
COLUM. L. REV. 529, 531 (2008) (footnotes omitted).
36. See BORK, supra note 11, at 144 (“The search is not for a subjective intention. If
someone found a letter from George Washington to Martha telling her that what he meant by
the power to lay taxes was not what other people meant, that would not change our reading of
the Constitution in the slightest. Nor would the subjective intentions of all the members of a
ratifying convention alter anything. When lawmakers use words, the law that results is what
those words ordinarily mean.”).
37. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 5, at 620–29; Lawrence Rosenthal, Does Due Process Have
an Original Meaning? On Originalism, Due Process, Procedural Innovation . . . and Parking
Tickets, 60 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 3–9 (2007).
38. Vasan Kesavan and Michael Stokes Paulsen tell a detailed and thoughtful tale of the
evolution of originalist thought. See Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 2, at 1134–48. But they too
convey an unduly rosy impression of coherence and continuity. See id.
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state conventions gave it the force of law? The early originalists could
not agree on the answer to that question. Meese focused on the intent
39
40
of the drafters; Berger initially concurred, but later shifted his focus
41
to the intent of the ratifiers.
The move from original intent to original meaning exponentially
multiplied that sort of internal disagreement among originalists. In
some respects, that move was simply a semantic one. Even before the
shift in rhetoric, Raoul Berger had defined “original intent” as “the
meaning attached by the framers to the words they employed in the
42
Constitution.” In other words, originalism was always to some
43
degree, at least to some originalists, about original meaning. It was
just that the original meaning was initially understood to be the
meaning originally intended by the drafters—or perhaps the ratifiers,
depending upon whom one asked.
But the rhetorical shift from intent to meaning also had
substantive implications—although exactly why it was important
again depended upon who was telling the tale. For many originalists,
the rhetorical change represented a shift from the intent of the
Framers to the understanding of the Framers—from what the Framers
actually intended the Constitution to mean to what they actually
understood it to mean. Thus, as the focus shifted from original intent
to original meaning, many originalists began to speak in terms of the

39. See Edwin Meese, III, The Supreme Court of the United States: Bulwark of a Limited
Constitution, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 455, 456 (1986) (“The standard of interpretation applied by the
judiciary must focus on the text and the drafter’s original intent.”); see also, e.g., Earl Maltz,
Foreword: The Appeal of Originalism, 1987 UTAH L. REV. 773, 774 (calling for “a jurisprudence
based on the intent of the drafters”).
40. See BERGER, supra note 31, at 365 (“Effectuation of the draftsman’s intention is a longstanding rule of interpretation in the construction of all documents . . . .”); RAOUL BERGER,
FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS’ DESIGN 3–20 (1987).
41. See Raoul Berger, Jack Rakove’s Rendition of Original Meaning, 72 IND. L.J. 619, 640–
41 (1997) (arguing that although the drafters’ intentions and understandings are usually
dispositive, they are so only when in accord with those of the ratifiers). Bork seems initially not
to have taken a stand. See Bork, supra note 30, at 826 (pressing the necessity of “interpret[ing]
the document’s words according to the intentions of those who drafted, proposed, and ratified
its provisions and its various amendments”). Later, he explained that the focus should be on the
“ratifying conventions” because it is “their intent, not the drafters’, that counts.” BORK, supra
note 11, at 181.
42. BERGER, supra note 31, at 363.
43. Indeed, Justice Black explicitly demanded a jurisprudence of original meaning in 1966.
See Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 677 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting) (lambasting
the Court for “consulting its own notions rather than following the original meaning of the
Constitution”).
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“public understanding” of the meaning of the Constitution. These
originalists explained that a judge should determine “what the
original language actually meant to those who used the terms in
45
question” —that is, the “meaning of the provision to the public on
46
whose behalf it was ratified.” As Keith Whittington explains, this
change in focus stemmed from the belief that, “[i]n ratifying the
document, the people appropriated it, giving its text the meaning that
47
was publicly understood.”
This shift was significant, but it was not a clean break. One can
find many references to original understanding in the early writings of
the originalists whose work is generally associated with original
48
intent, rather than original meaning. And one can find many
references to original intent in the later writings of the originalists
whose work is generally associated with original meaning, rather than
49
original intent. What is more, the move to original understanding did
not obviate the disagreement over whose intentions matter; it simply
replaced that debate with a new one among originalists—at least, that
is, among those originalists who abandoned the quest for original
intent—as to whose understanding matters. Some originalists have
50
focused on the understanding of the drafters; others on the

44. E.g., Kurt T. Lash, The Lost Original Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 83 TEX. L.
REV. 331, 339 (2004).
45. Steven G. Calabresi, The Originalist and Normative Case Against Judicial Activism: A
Reply to Professor Barnett, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1081, 1081 (2005).
46. Michael J. Perry, The Legitimacy of Particular Conceptions of Constitutional
Interpretation, 77 VA. L. REV. 669, 675 (1991); see also, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme
Court, 1999 Term—Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 29 (2000)
(“What counts as text is the document as understood by the American People who ratified and
amended it . . . .”).
47. KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING,
ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 60 (1999).
48. See, e.g., BERGER, supra note 31, at 366–67 (quoting favorably Jefferson’s promise as
the president to administer the Constitution “according to the safe and honest meaning
contemplated by the plain understanding of the people at the time of its adoption”).
49. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, Lawrence, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Supreme
Court’s Reliance on Foreign Constitutional Law: An Originalist Reappraisal, 65 OHIO ST. L.J.
1097, 1112 (2004) (“Surely, if that had been the framers’ intent, there would have been extended
discussion and controversy about the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV during the
ratification debates, which there was not.”).
50. See, e.g., Earl M. Maltz, Personal Jurisdiction and Constitutional Theory—A Comment
on Burnham v. Superior Court, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 689, 696 (1991) (arguing that originalism
“focuses on the original understanding of those who drafted the fourteenth amendment”).

COLBY & SMITH IN FINAL

252

10/6/2009 6:28:37 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 59:239

51

understanding of the ratifiers; and still others on the understanding
52
of the public.
For another group of originalists, the move to original meaning
was more profound than a simple shift from subjective intentions to
subjective understandings. It was instead a shift from subjective
meaning—what particular individuals actually intended the text to
mean—to objective meaning—the meaning reasonably suggested by
the words of the Constitution, as used in context at the time that they
were adopted. Slowly, the “original understanding” incarnation of the
“original meaning” incarnation of originalism has given way, for these
originalists anyway, to an originalism that focuses on objective
53
meaning.
At first, this notion of “objective” meaning was seemingly tied to
the actual understanding of the people. In insisting on objective
constitutional meaning, for example, the Reagan Justice Department
explained that “[o]ur fundamental law is the text of the Constitution
as understood by the ratifying society, not the subjective views of any
54
group or individual.” In other words, the objective meaning is the
one actually shared by the ratifying society as a whole: “The common
55
understanding of the text is what counts . . . .” As Justice Scalia
explained it, the originalist should seek the “meaning of the words of
the Constitution to the society that adopted it—regardless of what the
56
Framers might secretly have intended.”
Indeed, some originalists who seek the original, objective
meaning have in fact gone so far in the direction of reliance on the
actual public understanding as dispositive proof of original meaning
that they determine original meaning by reference to the concrete

51. See, e.g., WHITTINGTON, supra note 47, at 35–37; Charles A. Lofgren, The Original
Understanding of Original Intent?, 5 CONST. COMMENT. 77, 79 (1988) (discussing “ratifier
intent”); Ronald D. Rotunda, Original Intent, the View of the Framers, and the Role of the
Ratifiers, 41 VAND. L. REV. 507, 512 (1988) (noting Alexander Hamilton’s statements focusing
on the ratifiers’ intentions).
52. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past, 66 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1127, 1136 (1998) (“Originalism is the idea that the words of the Constitution
must be understood as they were understood by the ratifying public at the time of enactment.”);
Perry, supra note 46, at 677 (“It is the meaning to, or the understanding of, those, the
enfranchised, in whom sovereignty ultimately resides and on whose behalf the ratifiers acted—
those the ratifiers ‘represented’—that should matter.”).
53. See, e.g., OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, supra note 11, at 14–15; Scalia, supra note 3, at 38.
54. OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, supra note 11, at 17.
55. Id. at 20.
56. Scalia, supra note 34, at 103.
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expectations of the Framing generation as to how the constitutional
57
provision at issue would apply to a particular practice —an approach
that some commentators call original-expected-application
58
originalism. Justice Scalia often employs a particular version of this
59
practice in resolving constitutional questions, even though he has
60
disavowed it in his scholarly writing. Justice Scalia has frequently
decided cases on the basis of the proposition that if the first
Congresses and presidents engaged in a practice, then the Framing
generation must have expected and thus understood the practice to
be constitutional—in which case it “necessarily remains constitutional
61
today.” So wedded is Justice Scalia in these cases to the Framers’
expectations—as evidenced by the actions of early officials—that he
does not bother even to attempt to articulate the original meaning. As
Andrew Koppelman explains, “Scalia’s claim is that whatever
the . . . Clause means, it cannot apply to a practice of which the
Framers knew and approved. The argument is essentially, ‘I have no
idea what this provision means. But whatever it means, it can’t
62
prohibit this, because the framers approved of it.’” Koppelman
63
refers to this brand of originalism as “I Have No Idea Originalism.”

57. See John O. McGinnis & Michael Rappaport, Original Interpretative Principles as the
Core of Originalism, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 371, 378–79 (2007) (arguing in favor of giving very
heavy weight to original expected application).
58. See Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291, 295–97
(2007). This theory is premised not only on the notion that the meaning of a constitutional
provision is determined by “the meanings that words had at the time they were adopted” as
“read in light of [the provision’s] underlying principles,” but also on the notion that “the
concepts and principles underlying those words must be applied in the same way they would
have been applied when they were adopted.” Id. at 296 (emphasis omitted).
59. See Balkin, supra note 58, at 295–96 (“Scalia’s version of ‘original meaning’ is not
original meaning in my sense, but actually a more limited interpretive principle, what I call
original expected application.”); Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism and Its Discontents (Plus a
Thought or Two About Abortion), 24 CONST. COMMENT. 383, 386 (2007) (“[M]uch of Scalia’s
writing . . . does appear to endorse and rely upon the expectation originalism that he purports to
reject.”); Christopher R. Green, Originalism and the Sense-Reference Distinction, 50 ST. LOUIS
U. L.J. 555, 556–58 (2006) (noting Justice Scalia’s suggestion that “in order to maintain a stable
constitutional meaning, we must adhere to the Founders’ practices” (emphasis omitted)); Mark
D. Greenberg & Harry Litman, The Meaning of Original Meaning, 86 GEO. L.J. 569, 574–82
(1998) (surveying Justice Scalia’s opinions involving fidelity to originally expected practices).
60. See infra notes 259–66 and accompanying text.
61. See Colby, supra note 35, at 574.
62. Andrew Koppelman, Phony Originalism and the Establishment Clause, 103 NW. U. L.
REV. 727, 737 (2009).
63. Id.
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Most originalists who seek the original, objective meaning of the
64
Constitution, however, have explicitly rejected this practice. Indeed,
originalists have found themselves disagreeing with Justice Scalia on
matters of constitutional theory with increasing frequency. As
originalists Vasan Kesavan and Michael Stokes Paulsen explain,
“even though Justice Scalia remains the dominant figure in the shift
to originalist textualism, his is not always the most refined or
consistent version of the theory. In some ways, he is a leader whose
65
followers have bettered the leader’s own work.” According to
Kesavan and Paulsen, “[s]cholars and judges a half-generation
younger than Scalia, who are in some respects his heirs, often appear
to be employing more thoroughly and carefully honed versions of
66
originalist textualism.” As two such prominent originalists recently
said in taking issue with Justice Scalia, “[o]ne can disagree with giants
67
even when standing on their shoulders.”
This newer generation of originalists has developed a theory that
some of its proponents have labeled “original, objective-public68
meaning textualism.” This theory disavows not only original intent,
69
but also original understanding. Its proponents do not concern
themselves with how the words of the Constitution were actually
understood by the Framers, the ratifiers, the public, or anyone else,

64. See Berman, supra note 59, at 385–89 (“[L]eading academic defenders of originalism
have been disavowing expectation originalism for years.”); Colby, supra note 35, at 579–80 (“[I]t
would be a mistake to assume, as many commentators seem to do, that original expected
application is the prevailing academic model of originalism.”); Michael W. McConnell, The
Importance of Humility in Judicial Review: A Comment on Ronald Dworkin’s “Moral Reading”
of the Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1269, 1284 (1997) (“[N]o reputable originalist, with
the possible exception of Raoul Berger, takes the view that the Framers’ ‘assumptions and
expectation about the correct application’ of their principles is controlling.”). In particular, they
have disagreed with the assertion that the mere fact that the First Congress engaged in a
practice necessarily means that the practice is constitutional. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi &
Gary Lawson, The Unitary Executive, Jurisdiction Stripping, and the Hamdan Opinions: A
Textualist Response to Justice Scalia, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1002, 1045 (2007) (“The touchstone
must always be the Constitution, not what anyone in particular, including the First Congress,
says about the Constitution.”).
65. Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 2, at 1140.
66. Id.
67. Calabresi & Lawson, supra note 64, at 1009; see also, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Scalia’s
Infidelity: A Critique of “Faint-Hearted” Originalism, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 7, 23 (2006) (arguing
that “Justice Scalia misunderstands what originalism requires”).
68. Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 2, at 1132 (emphasis omitted).
69. See id. (“It is not a theory of anyone’s intent or intention. Nor is it a theory of anyonein-particular’s understanding. Nor is it a theory of the collective intention of a particular body of
people, or of a society as a whole.”).
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but rather with how a hypothetical, reasonable person should have
understood them. They “do not regard the search for original
meaning as a search for historically concrete understandings. Instead,
70
[they] conceive of the inquiry in hypothetical terms.”
This jurisprudence is so far removed from the “original”
originalism of the likes of Raoul Berger and Edwin Meese as to be an
entirely different constitutional theory. Kesavan and Paulsen explain
that “when [they] use the term ‘originalism,’ it is not in reference to a
71
theory of ‘original intent’ or ‘original understanding.’” But when
Berger and Meese use the term “originalism,” it is in reference to a
72
theory of “original intent.” And when Bork and a great many other
originalists use the term “originalism,” it is—at least more recently,
even if not always—in reference to a theory of “original
73
understanding.” Gary Lawson explains that original, objectivepublic-meaning textualism
is a hypothetical inquiry that asks how a fully informed public
audience, knowing all that there is to know about the Constitution
and the surrounding world, would understand a particular provision.
Actual historical understandings are, of course, relevant to that
inquiry, but they do not conclude or define the inquiry—nor are
74
they even necessarily the best available evidence.

But Raoul Berger, by contrast, had adamantly insisted as
recently as 1997 that “[o]riginalists do not speculate about how the
Founders ‘would have’ construed their handiwork; we rely rather on
what they actually understood, on their accompanying explanations
75
of what their words mean and are intended to accomplish.”

70. Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, When Did the Constitution Become Law?, 77 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1, 25 (2001).
71. Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 2, at 1132.
72. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 9, at 2 (“‘[O]riginalists’ . . . maintain that the provisions of
the Constitution mean what the Founders intended them to mean—the ‘original intention.’”);
Raoul Berger, Original Intent: The Rage of Hans Baade, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1151, 1159 n.48 (1993)
(“Originalists seek the maker’s intention.” (emphasis omitted)); Edwin Meese III, Reagan’s
Legal Revolutionary, 3 GREEN BAG 2D 193, 193 (2000) (noting that originalism involves “a
deep-seated commitment to the doctrine of original intent”).
73. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 11, at 143–44.
74. Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 398 (2002).
75. Berger, supra note 41, at 627 (emphasis omitted).
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B. The Many Spokes of Originalism
What is more, even among those originalists who claim to rely on
the original, objective public meaning of the constitutional text, there
is profound disagreement about the nature and effect of originalism.
Randy Barnett, for instance, appears to have espoused loyalty to the
new school of “original meaning” that focuses on the objective
76
meaning of the text. Aligning himself with Lawson, Paulsen, and
others, Barnett “claims to use the exact methodology those
77
sophisticated originalists use.” Yet he believes—in sharp contrast to
the other originalists whose methodology he generally shares—that
the major rights-granting provisions of the Constitution, including the
Ninth Amendment and the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, objectively have such a broad meaning that
they direct judges to interpret them at a very high level of
78
generality —so high in fact that they should be read to embody a
79
and essentially to “mandate[]
“presumption of liberty”
80
libertarianism at both the state and federal level.” Barnett’s
originalism, which empowers the judiciary aggressively to protect
countless individual rights from democratic infringement, is the
antithesis of the originalism of Scalia, Bork, and the many others who
seek to preserve democratic rule by limiting the scope of judicial
power to interfere with the output of democratically elected
decisionmakers and by narrowing the pool and scope of enforceable
81
individual constitutional rights. For this reason, other originalists
82
have been highly critical of Barnett’s theory. And Barnett, in turn,
76. See Barnett, supra note 5, at 620–29. Some of Barnett’s work seems to straddle—or not
to acknowledge—the line between the actual original public understanding and the hypothetical
understanding of an objective observer. Compare id. at 621 (seeking “the objective original
meaning that a reasonable listener would place on the words used in the constitutional provision
at the time of its enactment”), with id. at 627–28 (arguing that “[t]he public meaning of the
words of the Constitution, as understood by the ratifying conventions and the general
public . . . should prevail”).
77. Calabresi, supra note 45, at 1081.
78. See Barnett, supra note 67, at 23 (“That the founders . . . drafted texts that leave some
discretion in application to changing circumstances is not a bug. It’s a feature. Applying the
more abstract provisions of a text is required by a proper approach to originalism.”).
79. RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF
LIBERTY 253–69 (2004).
80. Calabresi, supra note 45, at 1081.
81. See infra Part III.C.
82. See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 45, at 1083–97 (“Barnett . . . claims that originalism leads
to judicial activism . . . . [but] Barnett . . . has failed in his quest to accurately describe the true
original understanding of the Constitution.”); Douglas G. Smith, Does the Constitution Embody
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has been highly critical of other originalists—specifically those
“original public meaning originalists [who] would have courts ignore
83
the original meaning of the text when it is insufficiently rule-like.”
Similarly, Michael Perry endorses a jurisprudence that seeks the
“‘objective meaning’ to the public at the time the provision was
84
ratified.” Perry explains that this inquiry is hypothetical: “it is what
85
the public ‘would have’ understood that should matter.” But his
originalism has a unique flavor. It “does not entail . . . a small or
86
passive judicial role.” Rather, because the Constitution is so
textually vague and open-ended, Perry believes that judges can
legitimately choose between many plausible original meanings, at
varying levels of generality, such that much of the Supreme Court’s
modern individual rights jurisprudence can (and should) be defended
87
on originalist grounds.
And the originalist tent keeps getting bigger. Bernadette Meyler,
for instance, has recently articulated a theory of “common law
originalism” that seeks the meaning of legal terms of art in the
Constitution by reference to the common law, but, “rather than
[being] static or inflexible,” “regards the strands of eighteenthcentury common law not as providing determinate answers that fix
the meaning of particular constitutional clauses but instead as
supplying the terms of a debate about certain concepts, framing
88
questions for judges but refusing to settle them definitively.”
a “Presumption of Liberty”?, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 319, 321–37 (criticizing the arguments that
Barnett advances in Restoring the Lost Constitution: The Presumption of Liberty).
83. Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent with Original Meaning: Not As Radical As It
Sounds, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 257, 264 (2005). Barnett cites Justice Scalia as an example of
such an originalist. See id. at 264 n.21. Michael Stokes Paulsen would be another example. See
Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Intrinsically Corrupting Influence of Precedent, 22 CONST.
COMMENT. 289, 296 n.18 (2005) (“[A] decision invalidating political action where the
constitutional text is vague or ambiguous (in the sense of failing to yield a determinate rule of
law) is simply an incorrect constitutional decision. Adherence to such a precedent is adherence
to a decision that is incorrect on originalist grounds and thus corrupts the interpretive theory of
originalism.”).
84. Perry, supra note 46, at 677 (emphasis omitted).
85. Id.
86. MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE COURTS: LAW OR POLITICS? 55
(1994).
87. See Richard B. Saphire, Originalism and the Importance of Constitutional Aspirations,
24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 599, 612–21 (1997) (“Perry now argues that originalism and a defense
of the modern constitutional jurisprudence of human rights can coexist. . . . [A]n originalist can
feel free to adopt either [plausible] position.”).
88. Bernadette Meyler, Towards a Common Law Originalism, 59 STAN. L. REV. 551, 558
(2006).
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Similarly, Jack Balkin has announced his recent conversion to
89
originalism. But his version of originalism, which he labels “text and
principle,” contemplates a Constitution “whose reach and application
90
evolve over time.” Balkin explains that under his theory, Roe v.
91
92
Wade was correctly decided. To most originalists, however, Roe
represents the very epitome of illegitimate constitutional
93
decisionmaking. It is thus likely, as Ethan Leib speculates, that
“many originalists will read Balkin to be a living constitutionalist in
94
disguise—and may not let him into their club.”
Perhaps. But there is, alas, no official gatekeeper for that club.
There is no person or body with the accepted authority to decide
whose theory is a pure version of originalism, and whose is not. As a
result, there is no single, formal, canonical version of originalism.
Indeed, any self-appointed gatekeeper who sought to weed out the
Balkins and the other heretics would probably find herself rejecting
the majority of originalists, because no matter which version of
originalism the gatekeeper followed, her theory would likely be
fundamentally inconsistent with that of many, or even most, other
originalists. As it turns out, there is no theory of originalism that
commands anywhere near universal consensus, even among selfprofessed originalists.
That discordance is not simply the product of the passage of
time. The history of originalism has not been a tidy story of steady,
linear evolution. Instead, at any given point in time, there have been
many mutually inconsistent theories of constitutional interpretation
that are unified, for the most part, only by their claims to carry the
banner of originalism.

89. See Balkin, supra note 58, at 293 (“I maintain . . . that constitutional interpretation
requires fidelity to the original meaning of the Constitution and to the principles that underlie
the text.”).
90. Id. (emphasis omitted).
91. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
92. See Balkin, supra note 58, at 319–36.
93. See, e.g., OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, supra note 11, at 63.
94. Leib, supra note 19, at 355; see also, e.g., Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Heller,
and Originalist Jurisprudence, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1343, 1371–72 (2009) (criticizing Balkin’s
theory and pressing the need “to distinguish genuinely originalist interpretations from those that
amount to living constitutionalism . . . dressed up in originalist clothing”). But see Randy E.
Barnett, Underlying Principles, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 405, 416 (2007) (taking Balkin at his word
that “he is sincere in his embrace of original meaning originalism” and expressing a substantial
amount of agreement with parts of his theory, while rejecting other parts of it).
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Consider, for instance, the state of originalism during one
snapshot in history in the late 1980s. In 1985, Michael Perry observed
that there were “different ways to conceive of originalism (and thus
95
of ‘an originalist approach to adjudication’).” Two years later, a
Federalist Society symposium on constitutional interpretation took
that conclusion to heart when it held a panel discussion on the topic
of “Originalist Theories of Constitutional Interpretation.” At that
symposium, Robert Bennett explained that there are different
96
“kind[s] of originalism,” a point elaborated upon in some detail by
Michael Moore, who explained that there are both “intentionalist”
and “textualist” flavors of originalism—each markedly different from
the other—and that, in turn, each of those subtheories has itself been
subdivided by originalists into still many more and different operating
97
versions. Thus, explained Moore: “Raoul Berger’s ‘old-time
religion’—intentionalist interpretation—is badly fractionated. There
98
is not just one kind of intentionalism.” Moore explained that the
same was true of the “textualist”—or “original meaning”—flavor of
originalism: “Textualism too is badly fractionated as a theory of
99
interpretation.” In response, Raoul Berger proclaimed himself
“surprised to hear about varieties of originalism,” declaring, “[t]he
only variety I know is the good, old-fashioned kind”—the kind that
100
treats “original intention” as dispositive. But Michael McConnell,
also a proud originalist, responded by defending a particular version
101
that is quite distinct from
of “original-meaning” originalism
Berger’s original-intent originalism. Indeed, McConnell vigorously
rejected original intent as illegitimate, even going so far as to give an
example of a case that “represents original intent subverting the
102
principle of the rule of law.”

95. Michael J. Perry, The Authority of Text, Tradition, and Reason: A Theory of
Constitutional “Interpretation,” 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 551, 597 (1985).
96. Robert Bennett, Originalist Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, 73 CORNELL L.
REV. 355, 355 (1988).
97. Michael Moore, Originalist Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, 73 CORNELL L.
REV. 364, 364–66 (1988).
98. Id. at 365.
99. Id. at 366.
100. Raoul Berger, Originalist Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, 73 CORNELL L.
REV. 350, 350 (1988).
101. In so doing, however, McConnell rejected the “original expected application”
jurisprudence often employed by Justice Scalia. See Michael W. McConnell, On Reading the
Constitution, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 359, 361–63 (1987).
102. Id. at 362 (discussing Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983)).
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That disagreement in the late 1980s did not reflect a onetime
bout of growing pains in the originalist movement. Indeed, if
anything, this state of affairs—the existence of an endless variety of
constitutional theories all claiming the mantle of originalism—has
become even more pronounced. There are not many proponents of
103
original-intent originalism left today, but original-understanding
originalism remains highly popular, in all of its various incarnations,
as does original, objective-meaning originalism—in all its countless
iterations, from the liberal versions of Jack Balkin and Michael Perry,
104
to the libertarian versions of Randy Barnett and Timothy Sandefur,
to the conservative versions of Justice Scalia and his many allies, to
the extremely textualist versions of Gary Lawson and Michael Stokes
105
Paulsen, to the philosophical version of Lawrence Solum.
And the debates among originalists today do not end there. To
take just one example of the polarizing debates currently raging in the
originalist community, consider the role of precedent in originalist
theory. Justice Scalia has famously declared himself to be a “fainthearted originalist,” insofar as he would sometimes allow judicial
precedent or societal custom to trump the original meaning of the
106
Constitution. Justice Scalia insists that “almost every originalist
107
would adulterate [originalism] with the doctrine of stare decisis.”
But a growing number of originalists would not. Gary Lawson, for
instance, has argued that it is unconstitutional for the Supreme Court
103. But there are still a few. See, e.g., Larry Alexander, Simple-Minded Originalism 1
(Univ. of San Diego Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 08-067, 2008),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1235722 (“[G]iven what we
accept as legally authoritative, the proper way to interpret the Constitution . . . is to seek its
authors’ intended meanings . . . .”). See generally Berman, supra note 59, at 384 (“[T]here does
exist a live intramural disagreement among originalists concerning whether to abide by the
originally intended meaning of the framers (or ratifiers) of constitutional text or the text’s
original public meaning.”).
104. See Timothy Sandefur, Liberal Originalism: A Past for the Future, 27 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 489, 490–91 (2004) (articulating, based in substantial part on the work of Scott
Gerber, a version of originalism that relies on the Declaration of Independence as part of the
nation’s organic law).
105. See Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism 2, 28–30 (Ill. Pub. Law & Legal Theory
Research Paper Series, Paper No. 07-24, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1120244
(articulating a version of original-public-meaning originalism that seeks a theoretical foundation
in the philosophy of language).
106. Scalia, supra note 2, at 864; see also Antonin Scalia, Response, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION, supra note 3, at 138–40 (“Originalism, like any other theory of interpretation
put into practice in an ongoing system of law, must accommodate the doctrine of stare decisis; it
cannot remake the world anew.”).
107. Scalia, supra note 2, at 861.
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to follow a precedent that deviates from the Constitution’s original,
108
objective meaning. And Michael Stokes Paulsen concurs that “stare
109
decisis . . . is completely irreconcilable with originalism.” Indeed,
Randy Barnett has argued that, because Justice Scalia sometimes is
willing to allow stare decisis to trump original meaning, “Justice
110
Scalia is simply not an originalist.” Even Justice Scalia admits that
“stare decisis is not part of [his] originalist philosophy; it is a
111
pragmatic exception to it.”
112
But some prominent originalists—including Robert Bork,
113
114
115
Lawrence Solum, and Steven Calabresi, among others —have

108. See Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 23, 27–28 (1994) (“If the Constitution says X and a prior judicial decision says Y, a court
has not merely the power, but the obligation, to prefer the Constitution.”). But cf. Gary Lawson,
Mostly Unconstitutional: The Case Against Precedent Revisited, 5 AVE MARIA L. REV. 1, 18–22
(2007) (arguing that stare decisis might be consistent with originalism when the prior decision
used the proper methodological approach to discern original meaning, even if it reached an
erroneous conclusion about the original meaning). Justice Thomas also appears to disagree, at
least to some extent, with Justice Scalia on the desirability and permissibility of deviating from
original meaning in the name of stare decisis. See Stephen B. Presser, Was Ann Coulter Right?
Some Realism About “Minimalism,” 5 AVE MARIA L. REV. 23, 28 (2007) (stating that Justice
Thomas “has argued that . . . constitutional adjudication should not involve the assumption that
stare decisis is the binding rule”).
109. Paulsen, supra note 83, at 289. According to Paulsen, “[s]tare decisis contradicts the
premise of originalism—that it is the original meaning of the words of the text, and not anything
else, that controls constitutional interpretation.” Id.
110. Barnett, supra note 67, at 13. According to Barnett, a true “originalist simply could not
accept that the Supreme Court could change the meaning of the text from what it meant as
enacted and still remain an originalist.” Barnett, supra note 83, at 263. Michael Stokes Paulsen
agrees, calling those who, like Justice Scalia and Judge Bork, would sometimes adulterate
originalism with precedent “would-be originalists.” Paulsen, supra note 83, at 289 n.2.
111. Scalia, supra note 106, at 140.
112. See BORK, supra note 11, at 155–59 (arguing that “[a]t the time of ratification, judicial
power was known to be to some degree confined by an obligation to respect precedent”).
113. See Solum, supra note 22, at 195–96 (arguing for “a system in which the decisions of the
Supreme Court which respect that text and original meaning are given binding effect”).
114. See Steven G. Calabresi, Text, Precedent, and the Constitution: Some Originalist and
Normative Arguments for Overruling Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 311, 314, 335–48 (2005) (“My conclusion is therefore that practice
has settled the matter such that the Court does have an autonomous, implied power to
sometimes follow precedent . . . .”).
115. See, e.g., Kurt T. Lash, Originalism, Popular Sovereignty, and Reverse Stare Decisis, 93
VA. L. REV. 1437, 1441 (2007) (“Preserving legitimacy under popular sovereignty-based
originalism . . . does not require the complete abandonment of stare decisis.”); Lee J. Strang, An
Originalist Theory of Precedent: Originalism, Nonoriginalist Precedent, and the Common Good,
36 N.M. L. REV. 419, 419–21 (2006) (arguing that “limited respect is due some nonoriginalist
constitutional precedent because of the larger societal and constitutional goal of effectively
pursuing the common good”).
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argued that some limited use of stare decisis to override the original
meaning is consistent with originalism. And other scholars have gone
even further in favor of reconciling stare decisis with originalism—so
far as to suggest that originalism requires the use of stare decisis in
some circumstances. Polly Price, for example, argues that the original
meaning of the “‘judicial power’ in Article III encompassed
significant respect for prior precedent as a starting point for judicial
decision making,” such that, “as a matter of original understanding,”
116
“an originalist owes some obligation to a nonoriginalist precedent.”
There is profound disagreement among originalists about this
fundamental aspect of their theory. And, as should be plain from the
account provided here, disagreement among originalists about
matters of considerable importance is becoming the rule, not the
exception.
II. ORIGINALISM’S LIVING CONSTITUTIONALISM
One conclusion that could be drawn from this conceptual
diversity and disagreement is that “originalism” is not a constitutional
theory at all, but rather is simply rhetorical code for a commitment to
a series of particular judicial outcomes favored by political
117
conservatives. A colorable case can be made for this claim,
especially if one recognizes that judges might be guided by such a
118
commitment at the purely subconscious level. But making sense of
the evolution and dissonance of originalist theory does not necessitate
that degree of cynicism. Originalism might better be understood by

116. Polly J. Price, A Constitutional Significance for Precedent: Originalism, Stare Decisis,
and Property Rights, 5 AVE MARIA L. REV. 113, 114 (2007); see also Lund, supra note 94, at
1347 (noting that “there is strong evidence that the Vesting Clause of Article III implicitly
incorporated a principle of stare decisis”); cf. Peter J. Smith, The Marshall Court and the
Originalist’s Dilemma, 90 MINN. L. REV. 612, 664 (2006) (arguing that originalists must account
for the apparent original understanding that the meaning of ambiguous constitutional provisions
would be “fixed” by adjudication).
117. See Bennett, supra note 96, at 358 (“What really animates much of the originalist
enterprise is not a reasoned conclusion that there is a theory there, but rather a dissatisfaction
with what is perceived to be mischievous judicial activism.”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The
Political Function of Originalist Ambiguity, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 487, 487, 492 (1996)
(noting that “defenses of originalism, with rare exceptions, leave its nature mushy and
confused” and concluding that originalism is in reality “most often a political or rhetorical
stalking horse for a set of substantive positions with respect to a relatively narrow set of
constitutional issues in the current age”).
118. See infra notes 225–310 and accompanying text.
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reference to its archnemesis, living constitutionalism. Modern
originalism’s genesis, of course, was as a response to the perceived
120
excesses of the theory of the living constitution. But originalism is a
jurisprudential theory undergoing its own endless evolution, with its
own living constitution. That is to say, originalists’ understanding of
the relationship among originalism’s current meaning, its original
meaning, and its underlying principles is similar to living
constitutionalists’ understanding of the relationship among the
Constitution’s current meaning, its original meaning, and its
underlying principles. Just as the theory of living constitutionalism
permits the meaning of the Constitution’s provisions to evolve to
reflect current societal values, the theory of originalism permits the
meaning of originalism to evolve to reflect current interpretive values.
Consider the argument that Justice Brennan, a leading
proponent of the theory of the living constitution, advanced about the
evolution of constitutional meaning. He argued that although the
“struggles against particular malefactions of the Crown . . . shape[d]
the particular contours” of the “fundamental principles” that the
Framers discerned, “our acceptance of the fundamental principles has
not and should not bind us to those precise, at times anachronistic,
121
contours.” According to this view, the Constitution contains broad,
119. The term “living constitution” is generally attributed to Thomas Grey, see Thomas C.
Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703, 711 (1975), although it
almost certainly has a lengthier pedigree than that, see Barry Friedman & Scott B. Smith, The
Sedimentary Constitution, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 13–14 (1998) (discussing the constitutional
theories of Sidney George Fisher and Christopher Tiedeman, who “urged the Court to
‘recognize the present will of the people as the living source of law’ and, ‘in construing the law,
to follow, and give effect to, the present intentions and meaning of the people’” (quoting
CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, THE UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 154
(Putnam 1978) (1890))). The notion of living constitutionalism is itself a broad tent. The version
that we have in mind here is the one articulated by Justice Brennan, the originalists’ own
boogeyman. Brennan argued:
Current Justices read the Constitution in the only way that we can: as twentiethcentury Americans. We look to the history of the time of framing and to the
intervening history of interpretation. But the ultimate question must be: What do the
words of the text mean in our time? For the genius of the Constitution rests not in
any static meaning it might have had in a world that is dead and gone, but in the
adaptability of its great principles to cope with current problems and current needs.
What the constitutional fundamentals meant to the wisdom of other times cannot be
the measure to the vision of our time. Similarly, what those fundamentals mean for
us, our descendants will learn, cannot be the measure to the vision of their time.
William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification, 27 S.
TEX. L. REV. 433, 438 (1986).
120. See supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text.
121. Brennan, supra note 119, at 437; see also Barnett, supra note 67, at 19 (“Although
alternatives to originalism are surprisingly hard to identify with any specificity, there is one very
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general principles that can—and ought to—be adapted to current
circumstances and understandings.
The same can be said of originalism. As our discussion suggests,
and as we explain in further detail in Part III, originalists generally
are in agreement only on certain very broad precepts that serve as the
fundamental underlying principles of constitutional interpretation:
specifically, that the “writtenness” of the Constitution necessitates a
fixed constitutional meaning, and that courts that see themselves as
generally empowered to give the Constitution some avowedly
122
different meaning are behaving contrary to law. Those precepts are
substantially broader and less constricting than the intention-based
animating principles that the original originalists—the “framers” of
originalism, if you will—articulated as essential to the originalist
enterprise. Subsequent originalists have been able to achieve
agreement on the broad underlying principles, but they have often
viewed as unduly narrow and mistaken the framing originalists’
understanding of how those principles must be put into action.
Of course, agreement on broad principles does not necessarily
produce one unified, coherent theory. For living constitutionalists,
this insight has led to the conclusion that the Constitution is capable
of sustaining many meanings, and that its broad animating principles
123
are capable of supporting many rules. Similarly, the core principles
upon which originalists agree are broad enough that one can fashion
from them a stunning variety of constitutional theories. Agreement
on the proposition that the Constitution must have a fixed meaning
leaves plenty of room for disagreement about what that meaning is,
and how and at what level of generality it is to be ascertained. The
project of actualizing these capacious principles into a working theory
popular method that can be called the ‘underlying principles’ approach. We discern from the
text the deeper underlying principles that underlie its particular injunctions. We then appeal to
these underlying principles to limit the scope of the text or ignore it altogether. Those who
employ this approach can claim that they are still enforcing the Constitution, in the sense that
they are implementing the principles for which it stands.”).
122. See Berman, supra note 21, at 22 (arguing that “[o]riginalism proper” is the view
expressed by the Court in South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 448 (1905), that “[t]he
Constitution is a ‘written instrument’” whose “meaning does not alter” but instead “means
now” what it “meant when adopted”); Solum, supra note 105, at 3, 5, 12 (arguing that
originalists of all stripes agree on the basic thesis that the Constitution’s meaning was fixed at
the time of origin).
123. See Brennan, supra note 119, at 437 (“To remain faithful to the content of the
Constitution, therefore, an approach to interpreting the text must account for . . . [its]
substantive value choices and must accept the ambiguity inherent in the effort to apply them to
modern circumstances.”).
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is a task that each generation of originalists has undertaken anew,
occasionally drawing upon, but occasionally rejecting, the work of its
predecessors. This, of course, sounds very much like the living
constitutionalists’ view of the manner in which constitutional meaning
124
evolves.
Thus, not unlike living constitutionalists, who have argued for
evolving constitutional meaning on the ground that “[w]hat the
constitutional fundamentals meant to the wisdom of other times
125
cannot be the measure to the vision of our time,” originalists have
pushed for changes in the working theories of originalism (in effect,
the “meaning” of originalism) as academic understanding of
constitutional and interpretive theory has deepened—and as they
have come to believe that the “framers” of originalism were wrong
about the interpretive implications of the broad, animating principles
of the movement. For instance, originalism shifted to original
meaning when it became clear that a jurisprudence of original intent
126
was conceptually untenable and was no longer in accordance with
127
contemporary interpretive values.
And, just as living constitutionalists have recognized that judges
must not “turn a blind eye to social progress and eschew [adaptation]
128
of overarching principles to changes of social circumstance,” and
that “the genius of the Constitution rests . . . in the adaptability of its

124. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 9
(1991) (“[T]he very meaning of the thing we call ‘the Constitution’ is a reality partly
reconstructed by each generation of readers.” (emphasis omitted)); Brennan, supra note 119, at
437 (“Successive generations of Americans have continued to respect these fundamental choices
and adopt them as their own guide to evaluating quite different historical practices.”); Friedman
& Smith, supra note 119, at 5–6 (“[H]istory is essential to interpretation of the Constitution, but
the relevant history is not just that of the Founding, it is that of all American constitutional
history.” (emphasis omitted)); Robert M. Shrum, Tribute to Laurence Tribe, 59 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 11, 12 (2003) (praising Laurence Tribe for recognizing that “the Constitution is
not an historical artifact frozen in amber, but that its words have a living meaning, and that
guarantees like ‘equal protection’ are an ongoing mandate for each generation to widen and
realize the ideals of liberty and justice”).
125. Brennan, supra note 119, at 438.
126. See supra notes 32–36 and accompanying text.
127. When one steps back from questions of constitutional interpretation and considers
interpretive theories more generally, one finds a familiar pattern of evolution. In the 1970s,
when the modern originalist movement began, intentionalism was the prevailing approach to
the interpretation of legal texts. See Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 6–23 (2006). It was not until the mid-1980s that textualist approaches to
interpretation began their ascendancy. See id. at 23–29. The evolution in originalist thought that
we have described here tracks this modern change in interpretive theory.
128. Brennan, supra note 119, at 436.
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great principles to cope with current problems and current needs,”
originalists have reconstituted their working theories of originalism as
they have been presented with new problems that were not
contemplated by the “framers” of originalism. For example, because
the mischief that brought the originalist movement into being was the
liberal “activism” of the Warren Court, the early originalists focused
130
on cabining judicial subjectivity and limiting judicial power. But as
the federal courts became increasingly populated with conservative
judges, the initial mischief that gave rise to the originalist movement
131
faded considerably. Accordingly, originalist theories evolved to
tackle new, previously ignored, and unforeseen problems that also
132
such as the
implicate the core concerns of originalism,
incompatibility of a substantial number of precedents (decided long
ago by nonoriginalist judges), and the incompatibility of many
democratically enacted laws, with the original constitutional meaning.
Many originalists thus changed their focus from seeking to limit
judicial power in order to empower legislatures to seeking to expand
133
judicial power in order to limit legislatures. Although this new focus
is consistent with the broader values and principles that have always
animated the originalist movement, it is wholly inconsistent with the
particular “original meaning” of originalism as understood by the
framers of the movement.
In sum, “originalism,” despite what its pioneers believed, is
capable of multiple meanings. Although in all of its various iterations
it has always been grounded in certain general animating principles,
originalist theory—the actual meaning of originalism—has evolved
129. Id. at 438.
130. See John Harrison, Forms of Originalism and the Study of History, 26 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 83, 83–84 (2003) (“The intuition, that judicial subjectivity was rampant and very
bad, got Originalism Mark I going.”); Whittington, supra note 1, at 599–603 (“It is important to
note that originalism was a reactive theory motivated by substantive disagreement with the
recent and then-current actions of the Warren and Burger Courts; originalism was largely
developed as a mode of criticism of those actions.”).
131. See Whittington, supra note 1, at 604 (“By the late 1980s, Ronald Reagan had
significantly changed the complexion of the Court. . . . If conservative originalism was to remain
relevant when its raison d’etre was gone, then it would have to change form.”).
132. Cf. Brennan, supra note 119, at 438 (“Time works changes, brings into existence new
conditions and purposes. Therefore a principle to be vital must be capable of wider application
than the mischief which gave it birth.” (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373
(1910))).
133. See Whittington, supra note 1, at 607–09 (“The primary virtue claimed by the new
originalism is one of constitutional fidelity, not of judicial restraint or democratic
majoritarianism.”). We discuss this point further in note 225, infra.
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over time to correct mistaken assumptions, to broaden myopic
visions, to keep up with evolving interpretive values, and to confront
unforeseen threats. That evolution has not been linear; at any given
time, there are countless competing versions of originalism. And
there is every indication that originalism continues to evolve and
splinter, now perhaps more than ever. Originalism—a movement
born of contempt for the notion of a living constitution of evolving
134
meaning—is itself a living, evolving approach to constitutionalism.
To be clear, we do not mean to suggest that there is something
inherently hypocritical about the fact that originalists insist that the
Constitution must have a fixed meaning while simultaneously
allowing the meaning of originalism itself to evolve. Although we
have analogized the evolution of originalism to living
constitutionalism, we recognize that originalism’s “constitution”—
that is, the core principles of originalist theory—lacks the features of
this nation’s Constitution that prompt originalists to insist that the
latter must have a fixed meaning; originalism’s constitution, unlike
America’s, is not a written one and was never ratified in any
particular form. Still, as we explain in Part III, originalism’s evolution
does indeed undermine originalists’ claims, but not for reasons of
hypocrisy.
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR ORIGINALISTS’ CLAIMS
In one respect, this story of evolution reflects well on originalists.
The proponents of any rigorous theory should, after all, constantly
strive to improve it, to smooth out the bumps of incoherence. For
most theories, this development is a virtue, a sign that its proponents
are sufficiently humble to respond to criticism and to recognize the
room for theoretical maturation while still holding on to their core
principles. But for originalists, there is a twist: the central claims of
their faith are to a substantial degree belied by the very existence of

134. Robert Post and Reva Siegel have also suggested that originalism has a living
constitution. See Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as Political Practice: The Right’s
Living Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545, 549–50 (2006). But their metaphor differs from
ours. Post and Siegel distinguish the scholarly jurisprudence of originalism from the political
practice of originalism. That is to say, although theoretical justifications for originalism focus on
its apolitical nature, in practice originalism is used to rally political actors and to champion
political outcomes. Thus, as the political commitments of the right change, the practice of
originalism changes along with them. Originalists, claim Post and Siegel, selectively ignore or
reinterpret the past to serve their evolving political agendas. It is in that sense that Post and
Siegel speak of originalism as having its own living constitutionalism. See id. at 565.
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this evolution and discord. Originalists have consistently insisted that
they have discovered the one, true faith—the one approach that is
self-evidently correct. Yet the faith, it seems, keeps changing.
The contours of originalist methodology might be in flux, but
originalists’ normative claims about the merits of their approach have
been largely consistent since the ascendancy in the 1970s and 1980s of
modern originalism. When we refer generically to “originalists” in
making this assertion, we obviously are keenly aware that the
originalist tent is a very large one—indeed, that insight is central to
our point, as should be apparent from Part I. But the reach of the tent
that we have in mind here is nonetheless not infinite. To borrow
Mitchell Berman’s thoughtful taxonomy, we address here claims by
“strong” originalists—that is, originalists who claim either (1) that
“whatever may be put forth as the proper focus of interpretive
inquiry (framers’ intent, ratifiers’ understanding, or public meaning),
that object should be the sole interpretive target or touchstone,” or
(2) that “interpreters must accord original meaning (or intent or
understanding) lexical priority when interpreting the Constitution but
may search for other forms of meaning . . . when the original meaning
135
cannot be ascertained with sufficient confidence.” Our quarrel is
with these thinkers, whom Stephen Griffin has referred to as
136
“exclusive originalists.”
To the extent that there are other
constitutional theorists who consider themselves originalists but do
137
not hold these beliefs, our objections do not extend to them.
In this Part, we consider what originalism’s constant evolution
and dissonance mean for originalists’ normative claims. Strong,
exclusive originalists may come in all shapes and sizes, but they have,
with remarkable (if not complete) consistency, made several

135. Berman, supra note 21, at 10. We might nuance this definition, as does Berman, see id.
at 22 & n.49, to include originalists who are sometimes willing to afford stare decisis effect to
nonoriginalist precedents that they believe to have been wrongly decided. See supra notes 106–
16 and accompanying text. We might also allow some room for “faint-hearted” originalists who
are willing to depart from original meaning (or intent or understanding) to avoid profoundly
immoral or unpalatable results in a very narrow category of extraordinary cases. See, e.g., Scalia,
supra note 2, at 864 (“I cannot imagine myself, any more than any other federal judge,
upholding a statute that imposes the punishment of flogging.”).
136. Stephen M. Griffin, Rebooting Originalism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1185, 1187 (referring
to an approach that argues that originalism is “the only (or at least primary) legitimate method
of interpretation” (emphasis omitted)).
137. Berman refers to these thinkers as “moderate originalists” or “weak originalists.”
Berman, supra note 21, at 10–12.
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sweeping claims about the normative superiority of their approach.
First, originalists contend that their methodology is the only
theoretically coherent approach to constitutional interpretation.
Second, originalists argue that because their approach accords to the
Constitution a fixed and determinate meaning based on the
document’s text, it is the only legitimate approach to constitutional
interpretation—that is, the only approach that is consistent with both
the Constitution’s status as law and the judiciary’s role in a
democratic society. Third, originalists argue that their approach is
uniquely promising for constraining the ability of judges to impose
their own views under the guise of constitutional interpretation. This
Part recounts each of these claims in turn, largely in the originalists’
own words, and seeks to demonstrate that they are significantly
undermined by the reality of originalism’s constant evolution and
dissonance.
A. Originalism and Theoretical Coherence
To take them at their word, originalists believe that there are two
categories of approaches to constitutional decisionmaking—
originalism and everything else—distinguished by their theoretical
purity or lack thereof. We have in mind the familiar claim noted at
the outset of this Article that originalism must prevail because (1) it
takes a theory to beat a theory, and (2) after decades of trying, the
nonoriginalists have been unable to agree upon an alternative. The
thrust of this argument appears to be that the very fact that
nonoriginalists cannot agree on an alternative theory is compelling
139
evidence that no such legitimate theory is possible. As Justice Scalia
138. We recognize that not every strong originalist has defended originalism on a ground as
aggressive as those described here. Notably, several prominent originalists have recently backed
away from the claim that originalism is uniquely able to constrain judges. See, e.g., John
Harrison, On the Hypotheses That Lie at the Foundations of Originalism, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 473, 473–76 (2008) (“I am deeply skeptical of the capacity of any methodology to
constrain any interpreter and thereby to keep Americans from doing what they love to do,
which is to find that their Constitution is good, and, therefore, contains what it needs to
contain.”); infra note 225 and accompanying text. See generally Whittington, supra note 1, at
608–09 (noting that in recent originalist writing “there seems to be less emphasis on the capacity
of originalism to limit the discretion of the judge” and that new originalists are “unlikely to
argue that only originalist methodology can prevent judicial abuses or can eliminate the need
for judicial judgment”). Still, in its strong form, originalism is distinct among constitutional
interpretive theories for the frequency with which its proponents have argued that it, and it
alone, is the only acceptable method for interpreting the Constitution.
139. As Gregory Bassham articulates it, “[Justice] Scalia argues that originalism is superior
to all nonoriginalist theories, because there is no agreement, and no prospect of agreement,
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puts it, it is simply not possible to achieve “consensus on what,
140
precisely, is to replace original meaning, once that is abandoned.”
Nonoriginalists, he argues, “divide into as many camps as there are
individual views of the good, the true, and the beautiful,” which
makes theoretical coherence among nonoriginalists a virtual
141
impossibility.
Randy Barnett has picked up on this theme,
dismissing nonoriginalism on the ground that “the opponents of
originalism have never congealed around an appealing and practical
142
alternative.” And when President Reagan’s Department of Justice

about which version of nonoriginalism should be adopted in its place. Over the past few
decades, a host of nonoriginalist theories have enjoyed their brief day in the sun, but none has
been widely accepted. Only originalism, he argues, provides a clear, fixed standard upon which
agreement is ultimately possible.” Gregory Bassham, Justice Scalia’s Equitable Constitution, 33
J.C. & U.L. 143, 149–50 (2006); see also James E. Ryan, Does It Take a Theory? Originalism,
Active Liberty, and Minimalism, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1623, 1631 (2006) (“As Scalia observed in his
1989 essay, it is impossible to ‘discern any emerging consensus among the nonoriginalists’
regarding the appropriate interpretive methodology. This remains true today. By their internal
disagreement and their very diversity, nonoriginalists unwittingly bolster the originalists’
assertion that nonoriginalists are simply making it up as they go along.” (quoting Scalia, supra
note 2, at 855)).
Lawrence Solum has suggested that Justice Scalia may not actually be making this
argument at all. According to Solum, Scalia might instead simply be making the standard
originalist argument that nonoriginalism’s flaw lies in the fact that (1) it necessarily relies on
moral judgments, and (2) in a pluralist society there is no possibility of consensus on those
matters, which (3) will inevitably lead judges to mistake their own views for constitutional
mandate. See Lawrence B. Solum, Constitutional Possibilities, 83 IND. L.J. 307, 336 (2008). If
Solum is right, then Justice Scalia’s language is uncharacteristically inartful here, and we are
mistakenly responding to a straw man. But other passages suggest that Scalia does indeed
intend to make the argument to which we are responding. Consider the argument that he
advanced in his other principal defense of originalism:
Apart from the frailty of its theoretical underpinning, nonoriginalism confronts a
practical difficulty reminiscent of the truism of elective politics that “You can’t beat
somebody with nobody.” It is not enough to demonstrate that the other fellow’s
candidate (originalism) is no good; one must also agree upon another candidate to
replace him. Just as it is not very meaningful for a voter to vote “non-Reagan,” it is
not very helpful to tell a judge to be a “non-originalist.” If the law is to make any
attempt at consistency and predictability, surely there must be general agreement not
only that judges reject one exegetical approach (originalism), but that they adopt
another. And it is hard to discern any emerging consensus among the nonoriginalists
as to what this might be.
Scalia, supra note 2, at 855. In addition, others have read Scalia as we do, and others have
separately endorsed the argument that we believe Scalia to be making, see infra notes 140–45, so
our response remains useful. In any event, if Solum’s reading is correct, then Scalia’s argument
is still undermined by the diversity of originalist theories for the reasons set out in Part III.C.
140. Scalia, supra note 2, at 862–63.
141. Scalia, supra note 3, at 45; see also supra notes 4–10 and accompanying text.
142. Barnett, supra note 5, at 617; see also id. (“The inability of the most brilliant and
creative legal minds to present a plausible method of interpretation that engendered enough
confidence to warrant overriding the text . . . make[s] . . . originalism much more attractive.”);
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produced a “Sourcebook” of originalist claims, its authors asserted
that “[a]lthough all [nonoriginalists] reject original meaning as
relevant to constitutional interpretation”—hardly an obvious or
143
accurate proposition, but that is another matter —“there is no
144
consensus among them as to an appropriate alternative standard.”
Indeed, this has been a constant refrain of originalists: that “one need
spend no time worrying over [nonoriginalism’s] legitimacy or
145
intellectual coherence because it pretends to neither.”
There was always something fishy about this it-takes-a-theory-tobeat-a-theory argument. By dividing the world of constitutional
interpretation into originalism and “nonoriginalism,” originalists have
146
stacked the deck in their favor. One could easily make the same

Raoul Berger, Response, “Original Intent”: A Response to Hans Baade, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1535,
1549 (1992) (“Even a Justice of the Supreme Court, Antonin Scalia, has entered the lists; after
examining the voluminous literature and dwelling on the non-originalists’ failure to develop a
theory acceptable to their fellows, he opted for originalism as the lesser evil.”); Berger, supra
note 41, at 646 (“Justice Scalia considers it a grave defect of the nonoriginalists that they have
been unable to agree upon an alternative theory.”); John O. McGinnis & Michael B.
Rappaport, A Pragmatic Defense of Originalism, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 383, 391 n.36 (2007)
(defending originalism on the ground that “judges of various ideologies cannot be expected to
reach agreement on any alternative method”); Michael D. Ramsey, Toward a Rule of Law in
Foreign Affairs, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1450, 1474 (2006) (reviewing JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF
WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11 (2005))
(“Nonoriginalism is, as an initial problem, not a positive constitutional theory: As Justice Scalia
colorfully points out, it is united only in agreement that orignalism is not the right approach; it
would substitute a bewildering array of proposals, yet agrees upon none. This difficulty is
particularly troublesome in foreign affairs law.”).
143. See, e.g., Farber, supra note 19, at 1086 (“Almost no one believes that the original
understanding is wholly irrelevant to modern-day constitutional interpretation.”); James E.
Fleming, Response, Original Meaning Without Originalism, 85 GEO. L.J. 1849, 1849 (1997)
(praising Michael Dorf for showing “that one can take original meaning seriously without being
a narrow originalist”); David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI.
L. REV. 877, 881 (1996) (noting that “[v]irtually everyone agrees” that the text and original
meaning matter in constitutional interpretation).
144. OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, supra note 11, at 7.
145. Bork, supra note 18, at 393 (describing Paul Brest’s constitutional theory); see also id.
at 387–88 (“The nature of the non-interpretive enterprise is such that its theories must end in
constitutional nihilism and the imposition of the judge’s merely personal values on the rest of
us. . . . Nihilism turns instead to advocacy of opportunistic judicial authoritarianism precisely
because what fuels the non-interpretivist impulse in the first place is a desire to change society
in ways that legislatures refuse. The desire for results is greater than the respect for process,
and, when theory fails, power remains.”).
146. Over the years, some commentators have contended that “theoretically, there is no real
distinction between originalism and nonoriginalism.” Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism as
Transformative Politics, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1599, 1602–03 (1989); see also MICHAEL PERRY,
MORALITY, POLITICS, AND THE LAW: A BICENTENNIAL ESSAY 279–80 n.7 (1988) (“There is a
sense in which we are all originalists: We all believe that constitutional adjudication should be
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argument about any method of constitutional interpretation. It would
147
be just as compelling to argue that common-law constitutionalism,
for example, must prevail because all of the many “non-commonlawists”—including the diverse adherents to the various schools of
originalism, along with a great many nonoriginalists of assorted
stripes—are unable to agree upon an alternative. Indeed, one could
come up with an entirely new (and entirely inane) theory of
constitutional interpretation—say, that the Constitution should be
interpreted by flipping a coin or by reading the stars—and then argue
just as convincingly that the theory must prevail on the ground that
(1) it takes a theory to beat a theory, and (2) all of the “non-coinflippers” or the “nonastrologers”—from original-intent originalists to
common-law constitutionalists to original, objective-public-meaning
148
textualists to believers in “constitutional moments” —cannot even
begin to agree on the proper alternative.
But our account of the substantial diversity and frequent
evolution in the originalist camp indicates that even if one allows the
originalists to stack the deck by dividing the world of constitutional
theory into originalism and nonoriginalism (rather than, say,
“common-lawism” and “noncommon-lawism,” or “process-based
149
theories” and “non-process-based theories” ), their argument that
originalism must prevail because it takes a coherent theory to beat a
coherent theory still holds no water. Intentionally or not, their binary
taxonomy paints a highly misleading picture of a unified, cohesive
originalist movement standing as one against a fractured, and thus
150
theoretically incoherent, hodgepodge of alternative approaches. As
grounded in the origin . . . . But there is a sense, too, in which none of us is an originalist . . . .”).
The account we provide here in some sense strengthens that view. Our objective, however, at
least for present purposes, is to take originalists’ claims as they make them. And to hear the vast
majority of originalists tell it, there is a world of difference between originalism and
nonoriginalism. But see Balkin, supra note 58, at 292 (arguing that the “debate between
originalism and living constitutionalism rests on a false dichotomy”); Solum, supra note 105, at
165–68 (arguing that some originalist theories are compatible with some theories of living
constitutionalism).
147. See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 143, at 885 (arguing that “the common law . . . provides the
best way to understand the practices of American constitutional law”).
148. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); BRUCE
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998).
149. Compare JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW (1980), with Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based
Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980).
150. See Brown, supra note 2, at 69–70 (“Even though there is no unanimity about what
originalism actually means, or what it calls upon judges to do in a close case, its adherents gain a
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we have sought to demonstrate, originalism is no more a single,
intellectually coherent theory than is “nonoriginalism”; originalists
cannot agree amongst themselves on constitutional interpretation,
either. What is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander: if the
substantial disagreement among nonoriginalists is persuasive
evidence that nonoriginalist theory is incoherent, then the substantial
disagreement among originalists must be equally powerful evidence
that originalist theory lacks coherence, as well. The reality of
originalism’s internal discord should put an end to the ubiquitous
argument that originalism is the only theoretically coherent approach
to constitutional interpretation.
B. Originalism and Theoretical Legitimacy
Originalists’ claims to unique theoretical coherence, then, are
(on their own terms) seriously undermined by the constant evolution
in originalists’ thinking and the constant infighting among originalists
about what their approach actually entails. But originalists do not
stop there. Modern originalists have also consistently argued that
originalism is not simply the only coherent theory, but also the only
151
legitimate theory of constitutional interpretation. This claim is
generally premised on assertions about the Constitution’s status as
law and the judiciary’s role in a democratic system. Most defenses of
originalism begin by noting that the originalist approach provides
fixed, determinate, and objective constitutional meaning based on
(some measure of) the original meaning of the constitutional text.
Justice Scalia, for instance, has argued that originalism treats the
Constitution as having “a fixed meaning ascertainable through the
152
usual devices familiar to those learned in the law,”
by
“establish[ing] a historical criterion that is conceptually quite separate
153
from the preferences of the judge himself.”
great deal by sharing one name that offers the appearance, if not the reality, of agreement. They
also gain the strategic advantage of claiming, by virtue of their name alone, the baseline from
which departures must be justified.” (footnote omitted)).
151. See Post & Siegel, supra note 134, at 547 (“Critics of the Warren Court began to argue
that determining the original understanding of the Constitution’s framers was the only
legitimate way of interpreting the Constitution, and they began to denounce all other
approaches to constitutional interpretation as improper and unprincipled.” (footnote omitted)).
152. Scalia, supra note 2, at 854.
153. Id. at 864. Lillian BeVier calls this the “impersonality” of originalism’s decisionmaking
criteria, which she argues “invokes all the virtues of objectivity and by implication rejects
subjective judging.” Lillian R. BeVier, The Integrity and Impersonality of Originalism, 19 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 283, 288 (1996); see also BORK, supra note 11, at 143 (“When we speak of
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For this reason, proponents argue that originalism is the natural
approach to interpreting a written Constitution. Keith Whittington,
for example, distinguishes the United States’ written Constitution
from the British reliance on practice and tradition, and he argues that
“[f]ixing constitutional principles in a written text against the
transient shifts in the public mood or social condition becomes
154
tantamount to an originalist jurisprudence.” Originalists argue that
their theory is the only one that is consistent with the view that the
written Constitution is a form of law. After all, the Constitution
itself—in the Supremacy Clause of Article VI—proclaims its status as
155
authoritative law. And its status as supreme law “can emerge from
the text as intended . . . only if the text has the fixed meaning it is
156
uniquely capable of carrying.”
Originalists also note that judicial review is premised on the
assumption that the Constitution is “the sort of ‘law’ that is the
157
business of the courts.” Originalists argue that originalism flows
naturally from this premise—indeed, “is a virtual axiom of our legal158
political system.” “The central premise of originalism . . . is that the
text of the Constitution is law that binds each and every one of us
until and unless it is changed through the procedures set out in
159
Article V.” And to interpret written law is by definition to
determine what the words originally meant—and thus always will
160
mean. Accordingly, originalists argue, “[i]f the Constitution is to be

‘law,’ we ordinarily refer to a rule that we have no right to change except through prescribed
procedures. That statement assumes that the rule has a meaning independent of our own
desires.”).
154. WHITTINGTON, supra note 47, at 53; see also BERGER, supra note 31, at 291 (“In
substituting a written Constitution and expressly providing for change by amendment, [the
Framers] evidenced that they had created a ‘fixed’ Constitution, subject to change by that
process alone.”).
155. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see also, e.g., Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 2, at 1127–28
(arguing that the Supremacy Clause mandates textualism as the only legitimate method of
interpretation).
156. WHITTINGTON, supra note 47, at 56; see also id. at 55 (“[O]nly a fixed text can be
adequately ratified, that is, legislated into fundamental law.”).
157. Scalia, supra note 2, at 854; see also Bork, supra note 30, at 824 (“Any intelligible view
of constitutional adjudication starts from the proposition that the Constitution is law.”).
158. Graglia, supra note 12, at 1020.
159. Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the
Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 551 (1994); see also Bork, supra note 18, at 384.
160. See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 13 (“[T]he long-accepted rule for interpreting legal texts
is to construe them to have the original public meaning that they had when they were enacted
into law.”); Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 159, at 552 (“The meaning of all such legal writings
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considered more than simply a traditional political document . . . but
instead is treated as an enactment of judge-enforceable law,” then
judges must seek to determine the original meaning of the words or
161
“to effectuate the intent of the authorized lawmakers.” Therefore,
originalists argue, “[i]f we are to interpret, then . . . we must be
162
originalists.”
Most sophisticated originalists do not rest this argument on the
mere assertion that the Constitution, as law, must be interpreted as
any other law—that is, to have a fixed meaning unless and until its
text is formally amended. Michael McConnell, for example, argues
“that there are two essential characteristics of any theory of
interpretation under our Constitution, which follow from the function
163
of constitutional interpretation in our system.” The first, as noted
above, is that “the constitutional text must be treated as ‘law’”; the
second is that “it must be understood as having its origins in the
164
consent of the governed.” According to this view, the foundational
notion of popular sovereignty requires originalist interpretation: if
“[a]ll power stems from the sovereign people, and the authority of the
Constitution comes from their act of sovereign will in creating it,”

depends on their texts, as they were objectively understood by the people who enacted or
ratified them.”); Lawson, supra note 17, at 1823; Solum, supra note 105, at 40–60.
161. OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, supra note 11, at 4 (“Once we recognize the importance of
the Constitution to constitutional law, we must also acknowledge the importance of the
Constitution’s original meaning to the Constitution.”); see also WHITTINGTON, supra note 47, at
59–60 (“[W]riting, especially legal writing, is a means of transmitting intent. . . . It can be certain
that the founders did intend to convey meaning in writing the Constitution.”); Graglia, supra
note 12, at 1023 (“Because the Constitution derived its legal authority only when it was ratified
at state conventions, judges should take it to mean what it was understood to mean by the
ratifiers or . . . the people they represented.”); id. at 1024 (“[I]nterpreting a document means to
attempt to discern the intent of the author . . . .”). Jack Balkin makes a similar argument, albeit
in a form probably not recognizable to most originalists and with strikingly different results. See
Balkin, supra note 58, at 295 (“Constitutional interpretation by judges requires fidelity to the
Constitution as law. Fidelity to the Constitution as law means fidelity to the words of the text,
understood in terms of their original meaning, and to the principles that underlie the text.”).
162. Whittington, supra note 1, at 612; see also WHITTINGTON, supra note 47, at 4 (arguing
that if we “take interpretation seriously . . . we [must] adopt an originalist approach to
interpretation”); Graglia, supra note 12, at 1029 (“Originalism is less a philosophy than a
definition of ‘interpretation,’ and a plainer, more conventional, or less esoteric definition does
not seem possible.”).
163. McConnell, supra note 101, at 360.
164. Id.; see also BERGER, supra note 31, at 296 (“Substitution by the Court of its own value
choices for those embodied in the Constitution violates the basic principle of government by
consent of the governed.”).
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then “[i]t follows that the Constitution should be interpreted in
165
accordance with their understanding.”
Continuing the theme of popular sovereignty, originalists
contend that originalism is the only approach “that permits our
166
society to remain self-governing” —that is, the only approach that is
consistent with the judiciary’s proper role in a democratic society.
Originalism is uniquely consistent with democratic government, they
argue, because it ensures that judges will invalidate democratically
enacted laws only when those laws conflict with the judgment of the
167
supermajority that ratified the Constitution. Robert Bork, for
example, argues that “only the approach of original understanding
meets the criteria that any theory of constitutional adjudication must
168
meet in order to possess democratic legitimacy.” Justice Scalia

165. McConnell, supra note 52, at 1132; see also WHITTINGTON, supra note 47, at 59 (“The
text is not simply a list of words but is the embodied will of the people.”); id. at 154 (“The
fundamental basis for the authority of originalism is its capacity to retain a space for the popular
sovereign.”); id. at 111–52 (arguing that a well-developed theory of popular sovereignty is an
important theoretical basis for originalism). See generally Lash, supra note 115, at 1440 (noting
“the most common and most influential justification for originalism: popular sovereignty and
the judicially enforced will of the people”). Other originalists, such as Judge Frank Easterbrook
and Randy Barnett, have made similar arguments based more explicitly on contract theory or
on the Constitution’s “writtenness.” See Frank H. Easterbrook, Textualism and the Dead Hand,
66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1119, 1121 (1998) (arguing that “the Constitution was designed and
approved like a contract,” and that “contractarian views imply originalist . . . interpretation by
the judicial branch”). Barnett, who concedes that contracts and Constitutions are different in
important ways, also argues that a Constitution’s “writtenness,” like a contract’s, entails a
commitment to originalism. See Barnett, supra note 5, at 629–36; accord BARNETT, supra note
79, at 112 (“Short of making the claim of illegitimacy . . . we are bound to respect the original
meaning of a text, not by the dead hand of the past, but because we today—right here, right
now—profess our commitment to this written Constitution, and original meaning interpretation
follows inexorably from this commitment.”); see also id. at 100–09. Barnett disagrees, however,
with McConnell’s focus on popular sovereignty as a justification for adherence to the Founding
generation’s Constitution, because “[u]nlike a contract . . . a constitution purports to govern
even those who did not consent to it at the founding.” Barnett, supra note 5, at 637 (emphasis
omitted); see also BARNETT, supra note 79, at 11–52 (arguing that the legitimacy of the
Constitution is not based on a theory of popular sovereignty).
166. OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, supra note 11, at 3.
167. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Lawrence’s Jurisprudence of Tolerance: Judicial Review to
Lower the Stakes of Identity Politics, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1021, 1043 (2004) (noting the originalist
belief that “[a]lthough such original meaning will sometimes trump the will of current
majorities, it is ultimately consistent with democracy because it reflects the will of engaged
supermajorities”).
168. BORK, supra note 11, at 143. Bork argues that originalism is “crucial” if we are “to draw
a sharp line between judicial power and democratic authority,” Bork, supra note 30, at 824,
because an application of originalism means that “[e]ntire ranges of problems will be placed offlimits to judges, thus preserving democracy in those areas where the Framers intended
democratic government,” id. at 827; see also BORK, supra note 11, at 163–64 (“[In] its
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similarly contends that originalism is uniquely “compatible with the
nature and purpose of a Constitution in a democratic system,”
because “the purpose of constitutional guarantees . . . is precisely to
prevent the law from reflecting certain changes in original values that
the society adopting the Constitution thinks fundamentally
169
undesirable.”
And Michael McConnell has argued that only
originalism produces democratic legitimacy because “[w]hen a judge
goes beyond the meaning of the words that were enacted . . . the
170
judge has no democratic warrant.”
The necessary implication of these assertions about originalism’s
unique compatibility with law and democracy is that any other
approach to constitutional interpretation is effectively lawless and
undemocratic. And originalists have been equally explicit on these
points. Lillian BeVier argues that nonoriginalist approaches to
constitutional interpretation are characterized by “the absence of
171
respect for (or even acknowledgement of) law as a constraint.”
Robert Bork contends that nonoriginalism is inconsistent with the
notion that the Constitution is a form of law because the very concept
of law “assumes that the rule has a [fixed] meaning independent of
172
our own desires,” and nonoriginalism inevitably requires judges to
173
rely on their own values in determining constitutional meaning.
And Michael McConnell argues that, if courts employ nonoriginalism,
then the Constitution is not law in any meaningful sense, but instead
174
is simply “a makeweight.”
vindication of democracy against unprincipled judicial activism, the philosophy of original
understanding does better by far than any other theory of constitutional adjudication can.”).
169. Scalia, supra note 2, at 862 (emphasis omitted).
170. McConnell, supra note 52, at 1136; see also WHITTINGTON, supra note 47, at 43
(arguing that originalism supports democratic legitimacy); Graglia, supra note 12, at 1026 (“If
the end is democracy, that end is served when judge-restraining originalism permits the results
of the democratic process to stand.”).
171. BeVier, supra note 153, at 287.
172. BORK, supra note 11, at 143; see also Lund, supra note 94, at 1370 (arguing that “living
constitutionalism . . . does not treat the Constitution as binding law”).
173. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J.
1, 10 (1971); see also Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 2, at 1130 (“It is simply not consistent with
the idea of the Constitution as binding law to adopt a hermeneutic of textualism that permits
individuals to assign their own private, potentially idiosyncratic meanings to the words and
phrases of the Constitution.”).
174. McConnell, supra note 52, at 1129. McConnell also argues that if a text must have
determinate meaning to count as law, then nonoriginalism, which is characterized by a lack of
objective standards, fails to treat the Constitution as law because embracing nonoriginalism is
tantamount to accepting that multiple interpretations of the Constitution might be equally good.
See McConnell, supra note 101, at 359 (“[W]e lawyers do not have the luxury of stating that
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To originalists, it follows that if nonoriginalism does not treat the
Constitution as law, then it must also fail the test of democratic
legitimacy. Robert Bork maintains that “no argument that is both
coherent and respectable can be made supporting [nonoriginalism]
because a Court that makes rather than implements value choices
cannot be squared with the presuppositions of a democratic
175
society.” Steven Calabresi contends that “[n]on-originalist judicial
review severely distorts the allocation of powers that is central to the
176
Constitution.” And former Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that
nonoriginalism—which he called living constitutionalism—is simply
177
“a formula for an end run around popular government.”
Central to the normative case for originalism, then, is not simply
the claim that the originalist approach is legitimate, but also the claim
that it is the only legitimate approach—that its alternatives are
fundamentally illegitimate. Although the point should already be
apparent, we belabor it for a moment longer to underscore just how
aggressively—and sometimes smugly and hubristically—originalists
have asserted their claims to unique legitimacy. Lillian BeVier, for
example, argues that “[i]ntegrity characterizes a judicial process based
on originalism, and its lack is one of the chief deficiencies of its
178
alternatives.” (Among the other deficiencies of nonoriginalism, she
says, are that it is “irredeemably hypocritical and essentially
179
dishonest.” ) Michael McConnell is more polite, if only slightly more
charitable; he argues that originalists “offer a principled justification
for the pattern of decisions they favor: that judges should interfere
with legislative decisions only when necessary to protect individual
rights or structural principles genuinely derived from the text of the
multiple interpretations [of the Constitution] are all ‘good.’”). This has been a common
originalist claim. See, e.g., WHITTINGTON, supra note 47, at 58 (“To give the words of the
Constitution new meanings over time would deny both the value and risk of a system of written
constitutions.”); cf. Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24
CONST. COMMENT. 427, 438 (2007) (“If we do not seek to be faithful to the Constitution, we
may be trying to improve the Constitution, but we are not trying to interpret it.”).
175. Bork, supra note 173, at 6; accord Bork, supra note 18, at 388 (“[N]on-intepretivism
ends in nihilism [because] it has proved wholly unable to meet a condition most theorists have
accepted as indispensable—consistency with democratic control of government.”); see also, e.g.,
McConnell, supra note 101, at 360 (arguing that any approach other than originalism leads to
the conclusion that the Constitution embodies “principles that the people did not choose,” and
that “such a holding has no democratic legitimacy”).
176. Calabresi, supra note 13.
177. Rehnquist, supra note 3, at 706.
178. BeVier, supra note 153, at 286.
179. Id. at 287.
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Constitution, as interpreted in light of history and tradition.”
Nonoriginalists, in contrast, “have yet to propound a comparable
180
theory.”
These criticisms are nothing new. Robert Bork made the same
181
case more than thirty-five years ago, arguing that nonoriginalism
fails the test of legitimacy because “[w]here constitutional materials
do not clearly specify the value to be preferred, there is no principled
182
way to prefer any claimed human value to any other.” And without
the constraint of constitutional text or history, he argued, “the judge
has no basis other than his own values upon which to set aside the
community judgment embodied in the statute. That, by definition, is
183
an inadequate basis for judicial supremacy.” Justice Scalia has
elaborated on this theme, arguing that the “principal theoretical
defect of nonoriginalism . . . is its incompatibility with the very
184
principle that legitimizes judicial review of constitutionality.” And
Michael Perry has argued that “[n]onoriginalist judicial review seems
fundamentally antithetical to basic axioms of modern American
185
political-legal culture.”
Thus, to take them at their word, originalists do not believe that
there are some good and some bad methods of constitutional
interpretation, with perhaps one that seems better than all the others.
Rather, they start from the premise that there is a correct method of
186
constitutional interpretation, from which it necessarily follows that
180. Michael W. McConnell, Active Liberty: A Progressive Alternative to Textualism and
Originalism?, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2387–88 (2006) (reviewing STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE
LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2005)).
181. Bork argued that if the Supreme Court “does not have and rigorously adhere to a valid
and consistent theory of majority and minority freedoms based on the Constitution”—by which
he meant originalism—“judicial supremacy, given the axioms of our system, is, precisely to that
extent, illegitimate.” Bork, supra note 173, at 4.
182. Id. at 8.
183. Id. at 10; see also BERGER, supra note 31, at 371 (arguing that nonoriginalist
approaches “convert the ‘chains of the Constitution’ to ropes of sand”).
184. Scalia, supra note 2, at 854.
185. Perry, supra note 46, at 687–88; see also Graglia, supra note 12, at 1044 (arguing that
nonoriginalist approaches mean, “as a practical matter, that the judge is the lawmaker, and such
review therefore cannot be legitimate unless the judge is authorized to be the lawmaker”—
which, of course, the judge is not).
186. See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 101, at 359 (arguing that “we lawyers do not have the
luxury of stating that multiple interpretations are all ‘good’”); Saikrishna B. Prakash,
Unoriginalism’s Law Without Meaning, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 529, 529 (1998) (reviewing JACK
N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE
CONSTITUTION (1996)) (“Originalism’s advocates claim that it supplies the one, true
interpretive method . . . .”).

COLBY & SMITH IN FINAL

280

10/6/2009 6:28:37 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 59:239

all other methods of interpretation are not simply inferior, but also
wrong. From the very beginning of the modern originalist movement,
originalists of every stripe have insisted unfailingly that theirs is the
one true constitutional faith—that only their approach is legitimate
and coherent and properly respects the Constitution and the
judiciary’s institutional role. To originalists, everything other than
originalism is constitutional heresy; nonoriginalist approaches are not
methods to interpret the Constitution at all, but rather are proposals
187
“to replace the Constitution as our fundamental law.” Originalism,
they believe, is the “only approach that takes seriously the status of
our Constitution as fundamental law and that permits our society to
188
remain self-governing.”
Yet when an originalist says that originalism is the only
legitimate method of constitutional interpretation, what he often
appears to mean is that his particular brand of originalism (which he
regards as the true form of originalism) is the only legitimate method
of constitutional interpretation. To originalists like Raoul Berger and
Bruce Fein, “the doctrine of original intent is the only legitimate
189
judicial guide for constitutional jurisprudence.” To originalists like
190
191
Saikrishna Prakash, Steven Calabresi, and Robert Bork, however,
“only the approach of original understanding meets the criteria that
any theory of constitutional adjudication must meet in order to
192
possess democratic legitimacy.” To originalists like Justice Scalia, by
contrast, the only form of constitutional interpretation that “take[s]
the need for theoretical legitimacy seriously” is an approach that

187. OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, supra note 11, at 66 (emphasis added); see also, e.g., Lino
A. Graglia, Constitutional Interpretation, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 631, 632 (1993) (arguing that
nonoriginalists “are not seeking a different means of interpretation—there are no different
means—rather, they are seeking to empower the Court to make constitutional law apart from
the Constitution”).
188. OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, supra note 11, at 3.
189. Bruce E. Fein, Comment, Original Intent and the Constitution, 47 MD. L. REV. 196, 197
(1987) (emphasis added); see also, e.g., BERGER, supra note 31, at 364 (delineating the
importance of “original intention”).
190. See Prakash, supra note 186, at 529 (citing Bork and arguing that uncovering the
“public understanding” is “the one, true interpretive method”).
191. See Calabresi, supra note 13 (“It is legitimate for courts to decide [controversial] issues
only when they are enforcing the Constitution as originally understood and ratified by the
people.”). Calabresi has at other times suggested that original, objective-public-meaning
originalism is the only legitimate method of interpreting the Constitution. See infra note 310.
192. BORK, supra note 11, at 143 (emphasis added). It was apparently of no moment that
Bork made this assertion not long after insisting that “original intent is the only legitimate basis
for constitutional decisionmaking.” Bork, supra note 30, at 823 (emphasis added).
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seeks the objective original meaning of the text. And to originalists
like Vasan Kesavan, Michael Stokes Paulson, and Gary Lawson, the
originalism that is the “single, ‘true’ method of constitutional
194
interpretation” is “original, objective-public-meaning textualism” —
which would have come as a shock to Raoul Berger and the other
pioneers of the modern originalist movement. To each of these
originalists, and to many others, it is not exactly that originalism
simpliciter is the only legitimate method of constitutional
interpretation; it is that each one’s particular version of originalism—
and, a fortiori, not any other version of originalism—is the only
195
legitimate method.
193. Scalia, supra note 2, at 862; see also Scalia, supra note 3, at 37–44 (rejecting the use of
original intent in favor of discovering an objective original meaning for the purposes of textual
analysis).
194. Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 2, at 1129; accord id. at 1121 (arguing that the
“interpretive project of determining the original public meaning of the Constitution” is “the
only truly legitimate approach to the interpretation of the Constitution as a legal document”);
Gary Lawson, Everything I Need to Know About Presidents I Learned from Doctor Seuss, 24
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 381, 387 n.26 (2001) (opining that “this particular species of
originalism is the correct way to interpret the Constitution”); Lawson, supra note 17, at 1834
(“[T]he Constitution’s meaning is its original public meaning. Other approaches to
interpretation are simply wrong.”).
195. Raoul Berger, for example, argued not only that original-intent originalism is the only
legitimate method of constitutional interpretation, but also that a focus on the objective original
public meaning is illegitimate. See Berger, supra note 100, at 353 (arguing that the “essence of
communication” is for “the writer to explain what his words mean; the reader may dispute the
proposition, but he may not insist in the face of the writer’s own explanation that the writer
meant something different”). Michael McConnell, in contrast, has argued not only that originalmeaning originalism is the only legitimate approach to constitutional interpretation, see
McConnell, supra note 180, at 2387–88, but also that original-intent originalism and originalexpected-application originalism are illegitimate, see McConnell, supra note 101, at 362 (arguing
that these approaches are, as represented by the decision in Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783
(1983), “subverting the principle of the rule of law”). Vasan Kesavan and Michael Stokes
Paulsen have argued not only that the “interpretive project of determining the original public
meaning of the Constitution” is “the only truly legitimate approach to the interpretation of the
Constitution as a legal document,” Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 2, at 1121, but also that
original-intent originalism and original-understanding originalism are illegitimate, id. at 1132–
33. Paulsen has gone even further, deriding even other original-meaning originalists—including
Justice Scalia and Robert Bork—as “would-be originalists” because they do not subscribe to his
particular approach. Paulsen, supra note 83, at 289 n.2. Randy Barnett similarly has argued not
only that original-meaning originalism is the only legitimate method of interpreting the
Constitution, see Barnett, supra note 5, at 630, but also that those self-proclaimed originalmeaning originalists (in particular, Justice Scalia) who are willing to follow precedents that are
inconsistent with the original meaning, or are unwilling to follow the original meaning of
constitutional provisions that are insufficiently rule-like, simply are not originalists, and thus do
not follow a legitimate method of constitutional interpretation, see Barnett, supra note 67, at 13.
And Gary Lawson has argued not only that original, objective-public-meaning originalism is the
only legitimate approach to interpreting the Constitution, see Lawson, supra note 194, at 387
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But there is something self-defeating in all of that. The claims
about the unique—and exclusive—legitimacy of originalism wither
when one considers the profound disagreement among originalists on
questions central to the interpretive enterprise. The frequent
originalist assertion that there is one and only one legitimate
approach to constitutional interpretation—in Kesavan and Paulsen’s
196
words, “a single, ‘true’ method of constitutional interpretation” —
has a certain rhetorical pull if one imagines originalists as offering a
unified, categorically distinctive approach to constitutional
questions—an argument along the lines of, “Everyone else labors in
the mistaken belief that there are no right answers, but we (and we
alone) have figured out that there is a universal truth out there, and
we know how to find it.” But that assertion is, at the very least,
substantially less compelling when it becomes apparent that
originalists themselves cannot even begin to agree on what their
correct approach actually entails. The profound internal squabbling
among originalists negates their self-assured claim that originalism is
197
“almost self-evidently correct” and “so obvious that it should hardly
198
need a name, let alone a defense.”
Of course, the mere fact that originalists disagree among
themselves does not necessarily mean that they are all wrong—or that
at least one of them is not actually right. It is possible that among the
many competing versions of originalism lies the one “correct” and
uniquely legitimate method of constitutional interpretation, just as it
is possible that there is a correct moral philosophy and a correct
answer to the question, “which was the greatest baseball team of all
time?” But if fifty people with fifty different approaches all insist that
their particular approaches are not merely the best but are also
correct, and that all other approaches are not merely less desirable
but also illegitimate and wrong, then one can have only so much
confidence in any one of their claims.
It is not simply the general claim to unique legitimacy that is
substantially more difficult to take seriously when one considers the
rapid evolution of originalist thought and the wide range of originalist
n.26, but also that all “[o]ther approaches to interpretation”—including what he calls “original
private meaning” originalism, which is tantamount to an approach that seeks the relevant
audience’s subjective understanding of the text, see Lawson, supra note 17, at 1826–27, “are
simply wrong,” id. at 1834.
196. Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 2, at 1129.
197. Graglia, supra note 12, at 1020.
198. Calabresi, supra note 13.
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views that currently exist, but also originalists’ specific claims that
their approach alone properly treats the Constitution as a form of law
and properly limits the judiciary to its appropriate role in a
democratic society. These claims start from the premise that
originalism (and only originalism) treats the Constitution as having a
199
fixed and determinate meaning. Yet the meaning that a committed
originalist judge would find obviously turns on the particular brand of
originalism that the judge applies. And over the last thirty-five years,
that meaning has been anything but fixed. A judge committed to the
originalist enterprise would once have invoked original intent, and
would today have the freedom to choose from a smorgasbord that
includes original intent and many other originalist approaches—
approaches that, in at least some important classes of cases, have the
potential to produce starkly different meanings of the constitutional
provision at issue, and thus to dictate starkly different outcomes.
To take perhaps the most obvious example of originalists’
invoking divergent theories and reaching disparate results, consider
the range of responses originalists have offered to Brown v. Board of
200
Education. In the 1970s, Raoul Berger argued vigorously that, as a
matter of original intent—which he claimed can easily be determined
from the debates surrounding the drafting and ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment—Brown was incorrectly decided (although
he also argued that this result obviously was undesirable as a political
201
matter).
But Robert Bork relied on a different version of originalism to
argue that Brown was correctly decided. Bork argued—first in 1971
and then again in 1990—that, although the Fourteenth Amendment
originally was intended and understood to permit segregated schools,
Brown nevertheless was correct because the “purpose that brought
the fourteenth amendment into being” was “equality,” and “equality
and segregation were mutually inconsistent,” even “though the

199. See Solum, supra note 105, at 4 (noting that “the claim that semantic content is fixed at
the time of origin plays a crucial role in all (or almost all) of the normative justifications for
originalism”).
200. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
201. See BERGER, supra note 31, at 117–33, 245 (arguing that “the framers had no intention
of striking down segregation”); see also Raoul Berger, Activist Indifference to Facts, 61 TENN. L.
REV. 9, 20–21 (1993) (highlighting that the decision to strike down segregation reflected neither
original intent nor contemporary political will).
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202

ratifiers did not understand that.” Bork thus viewed the original
meaning at a very high level of generality—so high, in fact, that many
commentators have observed that his approach is starkly inconsistent
203
with most standard versions of originalism.
Perhaps troubled by the implications of discerning original
meaning at such a high level of generality, Michael McConnell in the
mid-1990s made a different originalist argument in favor of Brown:
that Brown was in fact consistent with the original, narrow
understanding of how the Fourteenth Amendment would actually
apply to segregated schools. McConnell relied not on evidence of
strictly contemporaneous framer and ratifier understanding—which
would require reference to the debates of 1866–1868 on which Berger
had relied—but instead on evidence of Republican responses to the
204
proposed Civil Rights Act almost a decade later.
Steven Calabresi has indicated that he too believes that Brown
205
was correctly decided, on what he calls “new originalist” grounds.
Although he has yet to develop that argument in detail, in a recent
article, he (along with coauthor Sarah Agudo) sketches out one

202. BORK, supra note 11, at 82; accord Bork, supra note 173, at 14–15. Akhil Amar agrees
with this reasoning. See Akhil Reed Amar, Rethinking Originalism: Original Intent for Liberals
(and for Conservatives and Moderates, Too), SLATE, Sept. 21, 2005, http://www.slate.com/id/
2126680/.
203. See, e.g., Maltz, supra note 31, at 847 (“The difficulty with Bork’s principle is that it
superimposes his view of ‘neutrality’ on the Framers’ intent. If the concept of the intent of the
Framers is to have any coherent meaning, it must include the Framers’ idea of what lines can
appropriately be drawn.”); Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427, 432 n.25
(1997) (“If achieving ‘equality’ is the relevant intention, it would be equally originalist to say
that the Fourteenth Amendment enacted Marxism, on the theory that equality and capitalism
were mutually inconsistent, though the ratifiers did not understand that.”); Ronald Turner, Was
“Separate but Equal” Constitutional?: Borkian Originalism and Brown, 4 TEMP. POL. & CIV.
RTS. L. REV. 229, 262 (1995) (arguing that if originalists “wish to adhere to the Brown-is-right
position, something must give; that something may be a total abandonment of the originalist
analysis or a reformulation of originalism that results in a more flexible and broader conception
of what originalism entails”).
204. See Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L.
REV. 947, 1132–33 (1995); Michael W. McConnell, Segregation and the Original Understanding:
A Reply to Professor Maltz, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 233, 233 (1996) (defending Brown as
consistent with the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment).
205. See Steven G. Calabresi, Textualism and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 66 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1373, 1377 (1998) (stating that Brown “was warranted on textualist/originalist
grounds”); Steven G. Calabresi, The Tradition of the Written Constitution: Text, Precedent, and
Burke, 57 ALA. L. REV. 635, 655 n.138 (2006) (“For the record, I am working on an article
arguing that Brown was rightly decided based on the correct original understanding of the
Fourteenth Amendment.” (citing Steven G. Calabresi & Michael W. Perl, New Originalist
Justification of Brown v. Board of Education (unpublished manuscript))).
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possible argument for Brown based on objective original meaning. He
argues that the fact that, by 1868, thirty-seven states guaranteed the
right to public education in their state constitutions suggests that that
right is one of the “privileges or immunities” protected by the
206
Fourteenth Amendment. He further argues that the fact that
thirteen states had constitutional clauses explicitly prohibiting the
deprivation or unequal provision of privileges and immunities lends
207
support to the argument, previously advanced by John Harrison,
that the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities Clause is
best understood as protecting against the enactment of laws that
discriminate on the basis of race in the provision or protection of
208
fundamental privileges or immunities. Putting those two points
together, Calabresi explains, might “imply that a right to a public
school education in 1868 was a privilege or immunity for Fourteenth
Amendment purposes as to which the states were not allowed to
209
discriminate on the basis of race.” Rejecting original understanding
in favor of original textual meaning, he concludes:
The framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment may well
not have understood that the Amendment outlawed segregation in
education, but arguably that is precisely what it did. Obviously, it is
the formal text of the Fourteenth Amendment that governs, and not
the uncodified and erroneous ideas of the ratifiers of that text as to
210
what it might mean.

Earl Maltz, however, has challenged the originalist propriety of
Brown, relying on contemporaneous historical evidence of the
“understanding” of “those who drafted and ratified the Fourteenth
Amendment . . . during the earlier Reconstruction period” to
211
conclude that Brown is incompatible with originalism. (A decade
earlier, Maltz had made a similar argument relying on the
unambiguous “inten[t]” of the “Framers of the fourteenth

206. See Steven G. Calabresi & Sarah E. Agudo, Individual Rights Under State Constitutions
when the Fourteenth Amendment Was Ratified in 1868: What Rights Are Deeply Rooted in
American History and Tradition?, 87 TEX. L. REV. 7, 108–11 (2008).
207. See John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J.
1385, 1473–74 (1992).
208. See Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 206, at 96–97.
209. Id. at 110.
210. Id.
211. Earl M. Maltz, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions—A Response to Professor
McConnell, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 223, 231 (1996).
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212

amendment.” ) Similarly, John Harrison has at least hinted that
Brown cannot be reconciled with the text of the Equal Protection
Clause as understood at the time of the ratification of the Fourteenth
213
Amendment. And Justice Scalia has allegedly acknowledged that
214
Brown cannot be defended on originalist grounds.
It is not our objective here to referee these competing claims by
originalists about the validity of Brown. Our point is that these
originalists have not only drawn upon competing sources, but have in
fact employed a wide range of inconsistent approaches to originalism
itself—a wide variety of divergent constitutional theories—to reach
diametrically opposing conclusions to one of the most significant and
controversial questions of constitutional law. That fact suggests that
considerable skepticism is warranted toward the claim that something
amorphously called “originalism” is uniquely consistent with law and
democracy because of its ability to produce a single, objective,
unchanging constitutional meaning.
And it is not just the issue of segregation that yields different
215
results depending upon the version of originalism employed. The
same is true of countless other major constitutional questions. Jack
216
Balkin’s “text and principles” originalism vindicates Roe v. Wade,
whereas most originalist methodologies would reject it. Randy

212. See Maltz, supra note 31, at 846 (“[T]he historical record indicates unambiguously that
the Framers of the fourteenth amendment did not intend to outlaw state-imposed segregation
per se.”).
213. See John Harrison, Equality, Race Discrimination, and the Fourteenth Amendment, 13
CONST. COMMENT. 243, 254–55 (1996). We say “hinted” because Harrison does not directly
answer the question. He does suggest, however, that if the Fourteenth Amendment had been
ratified in 1954—the year that the Court decided Brown—it would have been far from clear
whether, in light of support for Jim Crow laws in a large part of the country, it would have been
understood to outlaw segregated schools, and he suggests, somewhat elliptically, that the same
was true in 1866. See id.
214. See Margaret Talbot, Supreme Confidence: The Jurisprudence of Justice Antonin Scalia,
NEW YORKER, Mar. 28, 2005, at 40, 54 (describing Justice Scalia’s response when asked about
Brown’s inconsistency with originalism). But see Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62,
95 n.1 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (suggesting that segregation was inconsistent with the
unambiguous textual meaning of the Equal Protection Clause).
215. It is certainly true that original public meaning, original understanding, original intent,
and original expected application often tend to collapse into one another in practice. See Colby,
supra note 35, at 581–82 & n.284, 598–99. But they can just as often produce starkly different
outcomes, especially when one considers the many subsidiary theories that fall within the
original-public-meaning tent.
216. See Balkin, supra note 58, at 311–36 (arguing that the text and underlying principles of
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection and Privileges or Immunities Clauses support a
constitutional right to abortion).
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Barnett’s “presumption of liberty” originalism would protect a nearly
217
infinite list of unenumerated constitutional rights, whereas Robert
Bork’s narrow original-understanding originalism essentially rejects
218
all unenumerated rights.
Original, objective-public-meaning
textualism yields a conclusion that Congress cannot strip the Supreme
Court of appellate jurisdiction over particular constitutional issues,
whereas original-understanding and original-expectations originalism
219
yield the opposite conclusion.
Original-expected-application
originalism supports the constitutionality of legislative prayer,
whereas other forms of originalism that seek to identify the principle
220
embedded in the text do not. Justice Scalia’s particular version of
expected-applications originalism supports the constitutionality of
government-sponsored Ten Commandments monuments, whereas
forms of originalism that seek to identify and vindicate the original
221
purpose of the Establishment Clause do not. And so on.
For a particularly timely example, consider District of Columbia
222
v. Heller,
the Supreme Court’s recent blockbuster Second
Amendment case. Justice Scalia’s majority opinion employed
original-public-meaning originalism, with an emphasis on the public
understanding and ordinary meaning of the text at the time of the
Framing, to conclude that the Second Amendment protects the right
223
to own and carry a gun for confrontation. Justice Stevens’s dissent,
by contrast, employed what is essentially an original intent
methodology to conclude that the Second Amendment does not
224
protect such a right.

217. See supra text accompanying notes 78–80.
218. See BORK, supra note 11, at 114, 118–19, 125 (characterizing judicial protection of
unenumerated rights as an illegitmate attempt to bypass the legislative process).
219. Or so say Steven Calabresi and Gary Lawson. See Calabresi & Lawson, supra note 64,
at 1015–25 (arguing that the text and structure of Article III establish that all federal judicial
power must be subject to the final authority of the Supreme Court).
220. See McConnell, supra note 101, at 361–63.
221. See Koppelman, supra note 62, at 728–29, 733–40, 743–49.
222. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
223. See id. at 2788, 2790–801, 2804–05; Solum, supra note 105, at 1–2.
224. See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2822 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that “there is no
indication that the Framers of the Amendment intended to enshrine the common-law right of
self-defense in the Constitution”); id. at 2835 (arguing that the drafting history “sheds revelatory
light on the purpose [and intent] of the Amendment”); id. at 2836–37, 2839 (arguing that the
majority “gives short shrift to the drafting history of the Second Amendment,” and that the
majority’s sources regarding the public understanding in the era after the Amendment went into
effect are not helpful because those authors “appear to have been unfamiliar with the drafting
history of the Second Amendment”); id. at 2841 (arguing that some of the majority’s sources
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C. Originalism and Judicial Discretion
Finally (and obviously related to originalists’ claims about law
and democracy), many of originalism’s proponents claim that their
approach is uniquely capable of constraining judges’ ability to impose
225
their views under the guise of constitutional interpretation. As

“cannot possibly supply any insight into the intent of the Framers”). Perhaps not surprisingly,
self-professed originalist commentators have disagreed about the propriety of the Justices’
approaches. See, e.g., Lund, supra note 94, at 1345 (“[T]he Court’s reasoning is at critical points
so defective—and in some respects so transparently non-originalist—that Heller should be seen
as an embarrassment for those who joined the majority opinion.”).
225. For the first thirty years of the modern originalist ascendancy, the “primary
commitment” of the originalist project was to judicial restraint. Whittington, supra note 1, at
602. Early originalists, after all, offered the approach as an antidote to the perceived judicial
excesses of the Warren Court. See BERGER, supra note 31, at 363–72 (asserting that a focus on
the Framers’ “original intention” is necessary to prevent “unbounded judicial interpretive
discretion”); Harrison, supra note 130, at 83–86 (explaining that early originalists believed the
Warren Court’s decisions were a product of the Justices’ “own views of desirable results” rather
than neutral legal principles). These originalists claimed that originalism would both limit the
opportunities of judges to displace the judgment of democratically elected officials, see, e.g.,
Bork, supra note 173, at 11 (asserting that “where the Constitution does not speak,” decisional
authority is with legislative majorities), and, by narrowing the focus of judicial inquiry to the
original meaning of the Constitution (or intent of its Framers), limit the discretion of judges to
impose their personal, subjective views of good policy, see, e.g., Scalia, supra note 2, at 863–64
(“Originalism . . . establishes a historical criterion that is conceptually quite separate from the
preferences of the judge himself.”). More recently, however, many originalists have tended to
downplay the arguments about the dangers of judicial authority, insisting not that judges should
“get out of the way of legislatures” but instead simply that judges must “uphold the original
Constitution—nothing more, but also nothing less.” Whittington, supra note 1, at 609. These
new originalists often have argued for more, not less, judicial interference with the work product
of democratically elected officials. See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 79, at 259–69 (arguing for the
abandonment of the presumption of constitutionality traditionally afforded to government
actions); Balkin, supra note 58, at 311–36 (arguing that originalist methodology justifies Roe v.
Wade). Still, even if there is disagreement among originalists about the general desirability of
judicial invalidation, in the name of the Constitution, of the output of democratic processes,
originalists regularly contend that originalism, by limiting the judicial role to a fixed historical
baseline, is substantially more likely than other approaches to constrain the ability of judges to
impose their views under the guise of constitutional interpretation. See, e.g., BORK, supra note
11, at 163 (“Many cases will be decided as the lawgivers would have decided them, and, at the
very least, judges will confine themselves to the principles the lawgivers intended.”); Scalia,
supra note 2, at 863–64 (“[T]he main danger in judicial interpretation . . . is that the judges will
mistake their own predilections for the law. . . . Nonoriginalism . . . plays precisely to this
weakness. . . . Originalism does not . . . for it establishes a historical criterion that is conceptually
quite separate from the preferences of the judge himself.”); Calabresi, supra note 13. Even those
originalists who have recognized that claims of originalism’s constraining power have often been
overstated have tended to view originalism as nonetheless meaningfully, even if not completely,
constraining. See, e.g., WHITTINGTON, supra note 47, at 89–99, 204–06; Amar, supra note 46, at
53–54 (“[Originalism] aims not to constrain more, but to constrain better, by focusing judges on
America’s most attractive legal norms as a matter of prestige and substance.”); Barnett, supra
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Steven Smith explains, “A central concern of originalism is that
judges be constrained by the law rather than be left free to act
according to their own lights, a course that originalists regard as
226
essentially lawless.” This claim proceeds from the premise that only
originalism uses an objective criterion that is “exterior to the will of
227
the Justices” —that is, some measure of the original meaning of the
Constitution’s text—to produce a fixed and determinate meaning. As
Keith Whittington explains, originalists have argued that if the
“political seduction of the law” is the principal threat from judicial
review, then “the best response” is to “lash judges to the solid mast of
228
history.” Justice Scalia argues that for this reason, originalism is
“less likely to aggravate the most significant weakness of the system
of judicial review”—that is, that “the judges will mistake their own
229
predilections for the law.” And Robert Bork has argued that with
its “attempt to adhere to the principles actually laid down in the
historic Constitution,” adoption of the originalist methodology “will
mean that entire ranges of problems and issues are placed off-limits
230
for judges.”
Originalists contend, moreover, that nonoriginalist approaches to
constitutional interpretation not only fail to constrain judges, but also
effectively invite judicial instrumentalism under the guise of
constitutional interpretation. Whereas “the textualist-originalist
approach supplies an objective basis for judgment that does not
note 67, at 23 (arguing that the Constitution’s broader provisions require some judicial
discretion, but are constrained by the original public meaning of their terms).
226. Steven D. Smith, Law Without Mind, 88 MICH. L. REV. 104, 106 (1989).
227. Bork, supra note 173, at 6.
228. Whittington, supra note 1, at 602. Whittington has argued, however, that “[j]udicial
restraint is an inadequate basis for justifying an originalist jurisprudence,” because
“[o]riginalism requires deference only to the Constitution and to the limits of human
knowledge, not to contemporary politicians.” He also doubts whether originalism can “provide
the type of restraints on judicial decision making favored by some of its advocates.”
WHITTINGTON, supra note 47, at 4.
229. Scalia, supra note 2, at 863. Justice Scalia argues that originalism is more likely to
create judge-constraining rules rather than standards that confer discretion. See Antonin Scalia,
The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1178–80 (1989); cf. McGinnis &
Rappaport, supra note 142, at 385 (arguing that the “most common defense of originalism” is
that it “generally ties judges to rules”).
230. BORK, supra note 11, at 163; see also BERGER, supra note 31, at 284–86; BeVier, supra
note 153, at 291 (“[T]he criteria of originalism constrain all the participants in the game—
including, most especially, the referees.”); Bork, supra note 30, at 826 (“The only way in which
the Constitution can constrain judges is if the judges interpret the document’s words according
to the intentions of those who drafted, proposed, and ratified its provisions and its various
amendments.”).
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merely reflect the judge’s own ideological stance,” Michael
McConnell argues, “constitutional interpretation based on the judge’s
own assessment of worthy purposes and propitious consequences
231
lacks that objectivity.”
Because nonoriginalist approaches to
constitutional interpretation are not limited by the original meaning
of the constitutional text, originalists argue, judges applying them are
free to rely on an infinite number of sources and even ultimately their
232
own conceptions of the public good.
And “[b]ecause these
alternative standards are so vague, [they] often lead[] to the
imposition of the judge’s personal concept of prudent public
233
policy.” Justice Scalia argues that “[n]onoriginalism, which under
one or another formulation invokes ‘fundamental values’ as the
touchstone of constitutionality,” by definition increases the risk that
judges will “mistake their own predilections for the law,” because
“[i]t is very difficult for a person to discern a difference between those
political values that he personally thinks most important, and those
political values that are ‘fundamental to our society.’ Thus, by the
adoption of such a criterion judicial personalization of the law is
234
enormously facilitated.” Lino Graglia puts it less charitably: he
argues that the “justification for judicial disallowance of political
choices—that the judges are enforcing the Constitution—is not
available” to nonoriginalists, “for they are by definition enforcing
235
something other than the Constitution.” Indeed, many originalists
not only think that nonoriginalist approaches are unlikely to constrain
judges, but also doubt that nonoriginalists even have any interest in
236
constraining judges.

231. McConnell, supra note 180, at 2415.
232. See, e.g., BERGER, supra note 31, at 370 (“If the Court may substitute its own meaning
for that of the Framers it may . . . rewrite the Constitution without limit.”); Lund, supra note 94,
at 1369–70 (arguing that living constitutionalism “simply replaces the written Constitution with
the political preferences of contemporary judges”).
233. OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, supra note 11, at 1; see also id. at 7 (“[A]ll noninterpretivist theories . . . provide no substantive guidance and can easily be manipulated by the
very people they purport to constrain, federal judges.”).
234. Scalia, supra note 2, at 863.
235. Graglia, supra note 12, at 1025.
236. See, e.g., OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, supra note 11, at 1 (“In effect, non-interpretivists
argue that life-tenured federal judges should have free rein to decide policy issues that affect
virtually every aspect of our society, restrained by neither the text of the Constitution nor the
electorate.”); Graglia, supra note 12, at 1032 (“What is wrong with originalism, its opponents
believe, what provides the fundamental impetus for their search for alternative, is simply that it
leaves too little for courts to do.”).
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These claims of originalism’s unique capacity for judicial
constraint are, however, substantially undercut by the reality of
originalism’s rapid evolution and long-standing fragmentation. Many
commentators have argued, quite persuasively in our view, that even
assuming that there is such a thing as a standard, correct originalist
approach, originalism—whichever version is canonized—is unlikely in
237
most important cases effectively to constrain judges. In fact,
commentators have suggested, originalists remain largely
unconstrained in practice, for at least three reasons. First, originalists’
claims about the constraining effect of their approach break down
when one recognizes that originalists—particularly judges who
purport to be originalists—sometimes selectively choose not to
238
employ originalism at all. Second, originalists’ claims about judicial

237. See, e.g., RAKOVE, supra note 186, at 10–11 (explaining that historical ambiguities make
it difficult to establish a fixed constitutional meaning); Colby, supra note 35, at 586–99 (“In the
cases in which the fear of judicial discretion is most acute, judges cannot render their decisions
on the basis of the original public meaning of the Constitution for the simple reason that there
never was such a meaning.”); Paul Finkelman, The Constitution and the Intentions of the
Framers: The Limits of Historical Analysis, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 349, 397 (1989) (“Because there
were many framers with differing intentions, it is impossible to determine with much specificity
what policies and programs were intended by those who made our Constitution in 1787 or
remade it in 1865-70.”); Thomas W. Merrill, Originalism, Stare Decisis and the Promotion of
Judicial Restraint, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 271, 277–82 (2005) (explaining that originalism is less
likely to result in judicial restraint than a system of precedent because originalism provides a
smaller body of norms, uses sources that are less accessible, and requires skills that are less
compatible with those of a typical judge); Peter J. Smith, Sources of Federalism: An Empirical
Analysis of the Court’s Quest for Original Meaning, 52 UCLA L. REV. 217, 282–86 (2004) (“The
fact that the historical record is susceptible to . . . conflicting interpretations means that there is
significant room for judges to slant the historical record to serve instrumentalist goals.”).
238. See, e.g., PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 101 (1991) (arguing
that Robert Bork “insists on 100% original understanding, 20% of the time”); Erwin
Chemerinsky, The Jurisprudence of Justice Scalia: A Critical Appraisal, 22 U. HAW. L. REV. 385,
385 (2000) (“Justice Scalia’s . . . jurisprudence of ‘original meaning’ . . . is . . . one that Justice
Scalia uses selectively when it leads to the conservative results he wants, but ignores when it
does not generate the outcomes he desires.”); Robert M. Howard & Jeffrey A. Segal, An
Original Look at Originalism, 36 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 113, 133 (2002) (concluding on the basis of
an empirical examination of Supreme Court opinions that “Justices might speak about following
an ‘originalist’ jurisprudence, but they only appear to do so when arguments about text and
intent coincide with the ideological position that they prefer”); Ira C. Lupu, Employment
Division v. Smith and the Decline of Supreme Court-Centrism, 1993 BYU L. REV. 259, 260
(1993) (“Justice Scalia, the author of [Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)],
claims to be an originalist. Smith shows no signs, however, of any such orientation; the Court’s
opinion totally ignores both the text and history of the Free Exercise Clause.” (footnote
omitted)); Gene R. Nichol, Justice Scalia and the Printz Case: The Trials of an Occasional
Originalist, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 953, 969–71 (1999) (arguing that, in cases involving takings,
free exercise, standing, and affirmative action, “Justice Scalia departs radically from his chosen
theory when it suits his fancy”); Eric J. Segall, A Century Lost: The End of the Originalism
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constraint are overblown because, when they do choose to employ
any particular form of originalism, originalists can, whether
consciously or subconsciously, pick and choose among the various
and often conflicting sources of original meaning (or understanding
or intent) to produce the substantive results with which they
239
personally agree. Third, originalism often fails to constrain judges
because the process of applying the original meaning (or
understanding or intent) to the particular problem at hand still leaves
room for substantial discretion on the part of the judge to follow her
personal preferences—especially when that meaning (or
240
understanding or intent) is articulated at a broad level of generality.
We do not seek to diminish these critiques, which we find quite
convincing. Instead, we seek to add another reason to suspect that
originalism is far from the constraining influence that its proponents
claim. The judicial-constraint defense of originalism turns on the
premise that originalism “establishes a historical criterion that is
conceptually quite separate from the preferences of the judge
241
himself.” But in reality, there is a dizzying array of originalisms,
each of which establishes a different “historical criterion.”
Accordingly, a judge who seeks to answer difficult questions of
constitutional meaning by invoking originalism in fact has significant
discretion to choose (consciously or subconsciously) the version of
originalism that is most likely to produce results consistent with his
own preferences.
Indeed, that is precisely what originalist judges have done. Even
those self-professed originalists on the bench who have claimed to
endorse one particular brand of originalism, to the exclusion of all
Debate, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 411, 427–28 (1998) (noting that Justice Scalia’s “votes to
overturn flag burning laws, hate speech laws, and affirmative action programs cannot be
reconciled with a strictly originalist approach to constitutional interpretation”).
239. See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, The Indeterminacy of Historical Evidence, 19 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 437, 437–41 (1996); Smith, supra note 237, at 279–86 (“Faced
with . . . indeterminacies [in historical materials], judges might be tempted—either consciously
or subconsciously—to read the history in a manner that advances their own preferences.”); cf.
Koppelman, supra note 62, at 749 (“Since the conclusions of historical scholarship shift over
time and since the judges are not constrained by the fact that a conclusion reached by some
scholar at some time has since been refuted, the consequence is to expand the field of judicial
discretion by presenting judges with a broad menu of possible interpretations, each of which
have [sic] sufficient originalist credentials to qualify for citation in the U.S. Reports.”).
240. See, e.g., Colby, supra note 35, at 600 (“[T]he higher the level of generality, the more
indeterminate the . . . originalist inquiry will be, and thus the less capable orignalism will be of
fulfilling its promise to constrain judicial discretion.”).
241. Scalia, supra note 2, at 864 (emphasis added).
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others, have in fact bounced around among originalist theories from
case to case, each time choosing the version of originalism that allows
them to reach their desired results. This point can be illustrated by
reference to the jurisprudence of the three most influential originalist
judges: Justices Scalia and Thomas and Judge Bork.
We begin with Justice Scalia—the most outspoken and revered
of originalist judges. Despite his strident claims to follow a consistent
constitutional jurisprudence, Justice Scalia has in fact drifted among
242
various versions of originalism.
Consider his approach to the Eleventh Amendment and the
question of state sovereign immunity. The Court’s recent decisions in
this area are, of course, all but impossible to square with either the
243
text of the Amendment or (most commentators have concluded) its
244
history. Justice Scalia has acknowledged that “[i]f this text were
intended as a comprehensive description of state sovereign immunity
in federal courts,” then many of the Court’s decisions in this area

242. He has also sometimes abandoned originalism altogether. See supra note 238.
243. The Eleventh Amendment provides: “The Judicial power of the United States shall not
be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S.
CONST. amend. XI. The Court, however, has concluded that the states are protected from suits
in federal court brought by their own citizens seeking to recover on claims arising under federal
law, see Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), and, more recently, that states are even immune
from private suits filed in state court, see Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999). See generally John
F. Manning, The Eleventh Amendment and the Reading of Precise Constitutional Texts, 113
YALE L.J. 1663 (2004); Lawrence C. Marshall, Fighting the Words of the Eleventh Amendment,
102 HARV. L. REV. 1342 (1989).
244. See, e.g., Martha A. Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity
Doctrines: Congressional Imposition of Suit upon the States, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 1203, 1279–80
(1978) (explaining that, as indicated by historical materials, sovereign immunity survived as a
common law doctrine but could be legislatively abrogated); William A. Fletcher, A Historical
Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of
Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1130 (1983)
(“[T]he adopters of the amendment originally had the more modest purpose of requiring that
the state-citizen diversity clause of article III be construed to confer jurisdiction on the federal
courts only when a state sued an out-of-state citizen.”); John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh
Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889, 2004
(1983) (“Neither federal question cases nor admiralty cases fit within [the Amendment’s]
language, within the intention of its framers, or within the interpretation that the Court
consistently gave it prior to the constitutional crisis of 1877.”); Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme
Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1, 55 (1988)
(“[T]he historic purpose of the Eleventh Amendment . . . suggests that the primary objective of
the . . . Amendment was to ensure that the Constitution not be construed to permit an
adjudication against a state, where suit was (1) based only on liabilities arising under state law,
and (2) brought originally in a federal forum whose jurisdiction was not subject to legislative
change or direction.”).
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245

But he nevertheless has
would be “unquestionably” wrong.
endorsed the Court’s decisions on the ground that an unwritten
“assumption” of state sovereign immunity “was implicit in the
246
Eleventh Amendment.” To be sure, that approach is not inexorably
inconsistent with an originalist jurisprudence, which Justice Scalia
247
claimed to have employed in reaching his conclusion. It might well
follow (assuming the correctness of the history upon which it is
based) from an original intent or original understanding approach.
But it certainly is in substantial tension with the particular version of
original-meaning originalism that Justice Scalia generally professes to
follow—a version that relies on the primacy of constitutional text in
the quest for constitutional meaning, and that treats the objective,
“original meaning of the text” as the touchstone of original
248
meaning. In the abstract (and in other contexts), Justice Scalia has
insisted that, when it comes to constitutional interpretation, “[w]ords
do have a limited range of meaning, and no interpretation that goes
beyond” the “limited range of meaning” that words carry is
249
“permissible.” Indeed, he has condemned interpretations that the
250
constitutional “language will not bear.” Yet when it comes to
interpreting the Eleventh Amendment, he reaches a result (one
251
generally preferred by political conservatives ) that cannot be
squared with, and is admittedly not limited by, the constitutional text.
Similarly, Justice Scalia has adamantly asserted that, because
what should matter to originalists is the original objective meaning of
245. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 31 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
246. See id. at 32–33.
247. See id. at 34.
248. Scalia, supra note 3, at 38; see also, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783,
2788 (2008) (Scalia, J.) (“In interpreting this text, we are guided by the principle that ‘[t]he
Constitution was written to be understood by the voters; its words and phrases were used in
their normal and ordinary as distinguished from technical meaning.’ Normal meaning may of
course include an idiomatic meaning, but it excludes secret or technical meanings that would not
have been known to ordinary citizens in the founding generation.” (quoting United States v.
Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731 (1931))).
249. Scalia, supra note 3, at 24.
250. Id. at 37.
251. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The “Conservative” Paths of the Rehnquist Court’s
Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429, 484 (2002) (“[T]he Court’s sovereign immunity
decisions are part of a broader agenda for the protection of a conservative vision of
constitutional federalism.”); Michael E. Solimine, Formalism, Pragmatism, and the Conservative
Critique of the Eleventh Amendment, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1463, 1464 (2003) (“[M]any
conservatives cheer on — or do not criticize — the Rehnquist Court’s Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence, perhaps because it resonates with a pro-federalism policy agenda.”).
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the text, rather than the subjective understandings of the Framers,
historical sources such as The Federalist should be used to determine
the common, objective meaning of the words used in the
Constitution, not to ascertain the actual, subjective understanding of
252
the Framers. But he has not always been faithful to that assertion.
253
254
In Printz v. United States, for example, Justice Scalia’s opinion for
the Court concluded that the federal government lacks authority to
compel state officials to implement federal law, even though he found
255
“no constitutional text speaking to this precise question,” and even
though the most relevant constitutional text—the Commerce Clause,
the Necessary and Proper Clause, and the Supremacy Clause (and
even perhaps the truistic Tenth Amendment)—appeared to cut
256
against his conclusion. Justice Scalia’s opinion relied heavily on The
Federalist not to determine the original meaning of the text, which he
concluded was all but irrelevant, but rather to ascertain “the historical
257
understanding and practice” of the Framers. Indeed, Justice Scalia
was so focused on the actual understandings of the Framers that he
went as far as to discount almost entirely the views that one Framer
expressed in The Federalist—concluding that Hamilton was too
nationalistic to be trusted—and to rely instead on another Framer’s—
258
Madison’s—particular understanding of the Constitution.
Moreover, in his academic writing, Justice Scalia has claimed to
reject the original-expected-application approach to originalism—the
notion that the Constitution must be interpreted to reflect the actual
expectations of the Framing generation as to how it would apply to
particular practices. In a response to Ronald Dworkin, Justice Scalia
explained that he follows what Dworkin calls “semantic intention”
252. See Scalia, supra note 3, at 38.
253. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
254. For additional examples, see Melvyn R. Durchslag, The Supreme Court and the
Federalist Papers: Is There Less Here than Meets the Eye?, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 243,
298 (2005). One such case is United States v. Hatter, 532 U.S. 557 (2001), in which Justice Scalia
cited The Federalist to determine what “the Framers . . . had . . . in mind” and what they
“believed” about the meaning of the Constitution. Id. at 583–84 (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
255. Printz, 521 U.S. at 905.
256. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Should the Supreme Court Read The Federalist but Not
Statutory Legislative History?, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1301, 1307 (1998).
257. Printz, 521 U.S. at 905; see also Eskridge, supra note 256, at 1305 (“To determine the
historical understanding and practice, Scalia relied strongly on The Federalist.”).
258. Eskridge, supra note 256, at 1307 & n.38. William Eskridge explains that Justice Scalia
was using The Federalist to establish that the Constitution “as specifically understood by at least
one framer” dictated the Court’s conclusion. Id.
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(and what Justice Scalia would call “semantic import”—that is, “what
the text would reasonably be understood to mean”) and not the
259
“concrete expectations of the lawgivers.” Although he suggested
that sometimes an original-expected-application approach will yield
the same result as an original-objective-meaning approach, he
260
concluded that only the latter approach is the proper one. On the
bench, Justice Scalia has indeed sometimes rejected an expectations
261
approach.
But at other times, he has in fact employed such an approach—
both in his academic writing and in his decisionmaking on the bench.
To take the most familiar example, Justice Scalia has argued that
capital punishment cannot violate the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment because its wide use at
the time of the Framing indicates that the Framers did not expect or
262
understand the Eighth Amendment to prohibit it. He has also
employed original-expected-application originalism, in the version
that Andrew Koppelman has labeled “I Have No Idea
263
Originalism,” in the many cases in which he has sought to determine
the constitutionality of a particular practice by asking whether the
Framing generation engaged in the practice shortly after ratification,
on the theory that this practice demonstrates authoritatively that the
Framing generation did not seek to prohibit the particular practice.
For instance, he used this approach in concluding that the
Establishment Clause allows government-sanctioned displays of
264
religion, and he used the converse approach—treating the absence
of a particular form of practice as strong evidence that the Framing
generation believed that the Constitution prohibited the particular

259. See Scalia, supra note 106, at 144.
260. See id.
261. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33–34 (2001) (“It would be foolish to
contend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been
entirely unaffected by the advance of technology.”); Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 379,
382 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[E]ven if a ‘frisk’ prior to arrest would have been
considered impermissible in 1791, perhaps . . . it is only since that time that concealed weapons
capable of harming the interrogator quickly and from beyond arm’s reach have become
common—which might alter the judgment of what is ‘reasonable’ under the original standard.”).
262. See Scalia, supra note 106, at 145–46 (“[I]t is entirely clear that capital punishment,
which was widely in use in 1791, does not violate the abstract moral principle of the Eighth
Amendment.”); see also Aileen Kavanagh, Original Intention, Enacted Text, and Constitutional
Interpretation, 47 AM. J. JURIS. 255, 279–82, 296–97 (2002).
263. See supra notes 62–63 and accompanying text.
264. See McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 885–905 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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practice—in concluding that the federal government lacks the
authority to compel state executive officials to implement federal
265
law. In these instances, Justice Scalia does not seek to determine the
original meaning of the Constitution. He instead places dispositive
weight solely on the actual narrow expectations of the Framing
266
generation.
In sum, Justice Scalia might insist that original-meaning
originalism is the only legitimate approach to constitutional
interpretation, but his application of originalist methodology has not
been a consistent story of fidelity to a particular version of originalobjective-meaning originalism. Rather, he has sometimes employed
versions of originalism that he has otherwise criticized in order to
reach results that appear to be consistent with his personal
preferences, but not with the version of originalism that he generally
endorses. This is not to say that Justice Scalia always, or even usually,
departs from a strict adherence to his original-objective-meaning
approach, but he has done so frequently enough that one must
question whether originalism is quite the constraining tool that its
267
proponents—principal among them Justice Scalia himself —claim
that it is.
And Justice Scalia is not the only originalist judge who has
tended to drift among the various iterations of originalism. Robert
Bork, the academic-originalist-turned-judge-turned-social-critic, has
also done so. First, as we described above, Bork shifted from original268
intent originalism to original-understanding originalism. Of course,
that move might simply reflect the same genuine intellectual
evolution that characterized much of the originalist movement in the
late 1980s and early 1990s. But Bork never actually expressly
acknowledged the shift, instead simply declaring, as he had previously

265. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905–10 (1997).
266. See Thomas B. Colby, A Constitutional Hierarchy of Religions? Justice Scalia, the Ten
Commandments, and the Future of the Establishment Clause, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 1132–38
(2006) (arguing that it is virtually impossible to articulate an original objective meaning of the
Establishment Clause that would account for Justice Scalia’s theory of the extent of the
government’s power to endorse religion—a theory that is based entirely on his understanding of
the expectations of the Framing generation and that eschews any effort to articulate the original
meaning of the Clause); Koppelman, supra note 62, at 737–38 (arguing that Scalia’s originalism
“does not attempt to state the principle for which the disputed constitutional provision stands”).
267. See Scalia, supra note 2, at 863 (arguing that originalism is “less likely to aggravate the
most significant weakness of the system of judicial review and more likely to produce results
acceptable to all”).
268. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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269

for original-intent originalism, that only the approach that he
270
eventually embraced was constitutionally legitimate. Indeed, as
James Boyle has noted, Bork simply lifted language from his earlier
writing in support of original intent originalism and replaced all
references to intent with references to “understanding,” an approach
271
that Boyle describes as “‘search and replace’ jurisprudence.”
Second, even accepting that the shift to original understanding
represented a genuine intellectual evolution, Bork has varied the
level of generality at which he seeks the original understanding,
depending upon the question at issue. When the question is whether
the original understanding embraces a constitutional right to
privacy—a question to which an affirmative response could validate
272
the Court’s decisions in Griswold v. Connecticut and Roe v. Wade,
among other cases that defy his policy preferences—Bork seeks the
273
original understanding at a very high level of specificity. He rejects
Griswold and Roe on the ground that contraception is not “covered
specifically or by obvious implication by any provision of the
274
Constitution” and “the right to abort, whatever one thinks of it, is
275
not to be found in the Constitution.”
276
Bork disdains the historical evidence that John Hart Ely,
among others, has provided to substantiate the claim that the original
understanding of the Ninth Amendment and the Privileges or
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was that they
277
protected unenumerated fundamental rights, insisting instead on
more specific evidence that the ratifiers sought to command judges to
“abandon clause-bound interpretation” in order to “create
269. Bork, supra note 30, at 823 (asserting that “original intent is the only legitimate basis for
constitutional decisionmaking” (emphasis added)).
270. BORK, supra note 11, at 143 (asserting that “only the approach of original
understanding meets the criteria that any theory of constitutional adjudication must meet in
order to possess democratic legitimacy” (emphasis added)). Bork claimed that his endorsement
of original understanding was simply a clarification of his earlier work. See id. at 144.
271. James Boyle, A Process of Denial: Bork and Post-Modern Conservatism, 3 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 263, 283–90 (1991).
272. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
273. Cf. Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Sex, Lies and Jurisprudence: Robert Bork, Griswold and
the Philosophy of Original Understanding, 24 GA. L. REV. 1045, 1082–85 (1990) (arguing that
Bork’s demand for such specificity for the right to privacy is actually inconsistent with the
originalist methodology that he outlines in his book).
274. BORK, supra note 11, at 258.
275. Id. at 112; see also id. at 100, 113–16, 118–19, 257.
276. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 22–30, 34–41 (1980).
277. See BORK, supra note 11, at 166, 177–85 (questioning Ely’s conclusions).
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unmentioned rights by an unspecified method.” Because such
evidence is, not surprisingly, elusive, Bork concludes that the
279
Constitution does not create a right to privacy.
But his approach is quite different when he seeks to discern the
original understanding of the Equal Protection Clause, at least with
respect to the question of racial segregation. As noted above, Bork
argues that the Constitution is properly read to prohibit racial
segregation because, notwithstanding the particular views of the
ratifiers about segregation at the time, the “purpose that brought the
fourteenth amendment into being” was “equality,” and “equality and
segregation were mutually inconsistent”—and this is the kicker—
280
even “though the ratifiers did not understand that.” Bork, of course,
281
cannot be faulted for recognizing, as have many others, that
originalism will fail to win adherents if it requires the politically
282
unpalatable conclusion that Brown was wrongly decided. But when
he chooses to employ an extremely high-level-of-generality version of
originalism in addressing the segregation question, he abandons the
narrower originalism that he applies to the question whether there is

278. Id. at 181–82.
279. See Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388, 1391–97 & n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1984); BORK, supra
note 11, at 118 (rejecting unenumerated rights because they are not specifically listed in the text
of the Constitution); cf. Robert H. Bork, Commentary, The Impossibility of Finding Welfare
Rights in the Constitution, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 695, 695–97 (“I represent that school of thought
which insists that the judiciary invalidate the work of the political branches only in accordance
with an inference whose underlying premise is fairly discoverable in the Constitution itself.”).
280. BORK, supra note 11, at 82; see also Bork, supra note 173, at 14 (“[Although] the men
who put the amendment in the Constitution intended that the Supreme Court should secure
against government action some large measure of racial equality . . . . those same men were not
agreed about what the concept of racial equality requires.”).
281. Because Brown occupies a position at the center of the untouchable canon of
constitutional law, see, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, “Wrong the Day It Was Decided”: Lochner and
Constitutional Historicism, 85 B.U. L. REV. 677, 681–82 (2005), as a practical matter, “[n]o
constitutional theory is taken seriously unless it can accommodate the result in Brown.” Michael
J. Klarman, Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge), 104 MICH. L. REV. 431, 488 (2005); see also,
e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, In Defense of Liberal Education, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 22, 26 (1993)
(arguing that “an approach to constitutional interpretation is unacceptable if it entails the
incorrectness of Brown”).
282. See BORK, supra note 11, at 77 (“Brown has become the high ground of constitutional
theory. Theorists of all persuasions seek to capture it, because any theory that seeks acceptance
must, as a matter of psychological fact, if not logical necessity, account for the result in
Brown.”); see also McConnell, supra note 204, at 952 (“The supposed inconsistency between
Brown and the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment has assumed enormous
importance in modern debate over constitutional theory. Such is the moral authority of Brown
that if any particular theory does not produce the conclusion that Brown was correctly decided,
the theory is seriously discredited.”).
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a right to privacy. As Cass Sunstein has observed, Bork’s typical
approach is to seek to resolve specific questions according to the
284
specific understanding or expectations of the Framers. But when it
comes to segregation, Bork abandons this approach in favor of one
that entails taking “the Framers’ understanding at a certain level of
abstraction or generality” in order to reach results that may be
inconsistent with the narrow expectations or understandings of the
Framers, but nonetheless accord with the fundamental values
285
underlying the Constitution. This approach allows Bork to reach his
desired result of upholding Brown while still claiming to be a faithful
286
originalist. To be sure, there have been other issues to which Bork
has applied a higher-level-of-generality version of originalism. The
most well known is the scope of the limitations that the First
287
Amendment imposes on claims for libel. But the flexibility that
Bork has shown on that question merely confirms our broader
point—that the wide range of competing versions of originalism
enables self-professed originalists to reach, while applying ostensibly
originalist methodology, virtually any result that they wish to reach.
Finally, consider Justice Thomas, who has long declared himself
to be an originalist. But of which variety? Justice Thomas has at times
283. See David A.J. Richards, Originalism Without Foundations, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1373,
1381–82 (1990) (reviewing BORK, supra note 11) (arguing that Bork’s high-level-of-generality
analysis of Brown is inconsistent with the very originalist methodology that he otherwise
advocates); see also supra note 203.
284. See Cass R. Sunstein, Five Theses on Originalism, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 311, 312
(1995). Sunstein calls this approach “hard originalism.” But see Reynolds, supra note 273, at
1070 n.90 (“[T]he question—even in Bork’s formulation—is not how the Framers themselves
would have decided such a question; Bork’s theory is more sophisticated than that. Rather, the
question is what principles we can draw from the Framers’ understanding of what the
Constitution was about so as to decide for ourselves whether the Constitution permits bans on
contraception.”).
285. Sunstein, supra note 284, at 313. Sunstein calls this form of originalism “soft
originalism.”
286. See BORK, supra note 11, at 82 (arguing that it is possible to reconcile the result in
Brown with the Framers’ original understanding that segregation was not objectionable).
287. See, e.g., Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 996 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (Bork, J.,
concurring) (“We know very little of the precise intentions of the framers and ratifiers of the
speech and press clauses of the first amendment. But we do know that they gave into our
keeping the value of preserving free expression and, in particular, the preservation of political
expression, which is commonly conceded to be the value at the core of those clauses. Perhaps
the framers did not envision libel actions as a major threat to that freedom. . . . But if, over time,
the libel action becomes a threat to the central meaning of the first amendment, why should not
judges adapt their doctrines?”); Harrison, supra note 138, at 479–80 (noting that Bork’s Ollman
opinion employs a sort of “purposivism”—originalism that “tak[es] as normative the original
purpose” of the First Amendment).
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explicitly sought the original intent of the Framers. At other times,
289
he has sought the original meaning of the Constitution, which he
equates with the original understanding of the Constitution’s
290
meaning —in particular, with the understanding held by the Framers
291
themselves. Thus, he often articulates the judge’s task as discovering
292
the Framers’ understanding of the Constitution. In truth, however,

288. See, e.g., Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 836 (2006) (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part) (noting that “it is unlikely that the Framers intended
the word ‘witness’ to be read so broadly as to include such statements”); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,
542 U.S. 507, 580 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The Founders intended that the President
have primary responsibility—along with the necessary power—to protect the national security
and to conduct the Nation’s foreign relations.”); U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S.
779, 898 n.22 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (asking “whether the Framers intended to preclude
the people of each State from supplementing the constitutional qualifications”).
289. See, e.g., Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 128 S. Ct. 2578, 2595 (2008) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (rejecting the majority’s holding because it “is not supported by the original meaning
of the Sixth Amendment”); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 518 (2000) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (seeking “the original meaning of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments”).
290. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 506 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(“Today’s decision is simply the latest in a string of our cases construing the Public Use Clause
to be a virtual nullity, without the slightest nod to its original meaning. In my view, the Public
Use Clause, originally understood, is a meaningful limit on the government’s eminent domain
power. Our cases have strayed from the Clause’s original meaning, and I would reconsider
them.” (emphases added)); Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452, 490–91 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (equating original meaning with original understanding); see also
Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1556 (2008) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (rejecting
the majority’s holding because it “finds no support in the original understanding of the Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause”); Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 420 (2007) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (“The Tinker Court made little attempt to ground its holding in . . . the original
understanding of the First Amendment.”); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 80 (2000) (Thomas,
J., concurring in the judgment) (noting that neither party argued whether “our substantive due
process cases were wrongly decided and . . . [whether] the original understanding of the Due
Process Clause precludes judicial enforcement of unenumerated rights”); United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Until this Court replaces its
existing Commerce Clause jurisprudence with a standard more consistent with the original
understanding, we will continue to see Congress appropriating state police powers under the
guise of regulating commerce.”); Clarence Thomas, Judging, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 6 (1996)
(arguing that “when interpreting the Constitution, judges should seek the original
understanding of the provision’s text”).
291. See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 693 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[O]ur
task would be far simpler if we returned to the original meaning of the word ‘establishment’
than it is under the various approaches this Court now uses. The Framers understood an
establishment necessarily [to] involve actual legal coercion.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 528 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[W]e should
endeavor to understand what the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment thought that it
meant.”).
292. See, e.g., Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 380 (2006) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (“The Framers understood [that] ‘[i]t is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to
be amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent.’” (quoting Hans v. Louisiana, 134
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he seems not to contemplate any distinction among original intent,
original understanding, and original textual meaning. For instance, in
293
he articulates his
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission,
constitutional jurisprudence as follows:
When interpreting the Free Speech and Press Clauses, we must be
guided by their original meaning, for “[t]he Constitution is a written
instrument. As such its meaning does not alter. That which it meant
when adopted, it means now.” We have long recognized that the
meaning of the Constitution “must necessarily depend on the words
of the constitution [and] the meaning and intention of the
convention which framed and proposed it for adoption and
ratification to the conventions . . . in the several states.” We should
seek the original understanding when we interpret the Speech and
294
Press Clauses . . . .

This conflation of distinct modes of originalism allows him to draw
indiscriminately on sources that are of differing value to different
295
versions of originalism—Anglo-American law and tradition, the
296
297
drafting history of the Constitution, the ratification history,

U.S. 1, 13 (1890))); id. at 385–86 (noting that the “practice of the early Congresses can provide
valuable insight into the Framers’ understanding of the Constitution”); Whitman v. Am.
Trucking Ass’ns., 531 U.S. 457, 487 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I would be willing to
address the question whether our delegation jurisprudence has strayed too far from our
Founders’ understanding of separation of powers.”).
293. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
294. Id. at 359 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (emphasis added) (citations
omitted) (quoting South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 448 (1905); Rhode Island v.
Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 721 (1838)).
295. See, e.g., Rothgery v. Gillespie, 128 S. Ct. 2578, 2596 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(relying on Blackstone); Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1556 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment)
(relying on “the historical practices that led the Framers to include [the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause] in the Bill of Rights”). This evidence is of greater import to versions of
originalism that seek the underlying purpose than to those that seek the objective textual
meaning.
296. See, e.g., Saenz, 526 U.S. at 526 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing congressional debates
over the Fourteenth Amendment); U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 876–77 (1995)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing cases that rely on drafting debates from the Constitutional
Convention). This body of evidence is, of course, of central import to those who seek the
original intent of the Framers. See, e.g., BERGER, supra note 31, at 300–02 (relying on
Convention debates). Proponents of the original-understanding version of originalism, by
contrast, typically argue that it is inappropriate (and perhaps even illegitimate) to consider
evidence from the Constitutional Convention in 1787 in seeking to discern the original
understanding. Steven Calabresi and Saikrishna Prakash, for example, have argued that the
original understanding approach’s focus on the ratifiers’ understanding of the text forecloses
reference to a drafting history that had not been disclosed at the time of the ratification
conventions, and thus was unknown to the ratifiers. See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 159, at
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postenactment behavior and statements of government officials,
299
300
and eighteenth-century dictionaries, among other evidence —
which of course broadens his ability to find evidence to support what
may really be a subconsciously predetermined meaning that yields his
preferred outcome.
Indeed, after a thorough study of Justice Thomas’s
jurisprudence, Scott Gerber has concluded that “Justice Thomas is a
‘liberal originalist’ on civil rights and a ‘conservative originalist’ on
301
civil liberties and federalism.” Gerber uses the term “liberal
originalism” to refer to the notion that the Constitution should be
interpreted at a higher level of generality to reflect the natural-law
inspired political philosophy of the Declaration of Independence, and
the term “conservative originalism” to refer to the notion that the
Constitution should be interpreted in the same manner in which the

576 (“Since originalists maintain that it is the meaning of the text to the ratifiers that counts, they
should give little weight to an antitextual argument derived from legislative history.”); Steven G.
Calabresi, The Political Question of Presidential Succession, 48 STAN. L. REV. 155, 161 n.37
(1995) (“There are very serious reasons to question whether any weight at all should be
given . . . to Madison’s secret legislative history from Philadelphia . . . .”). But, as Kesavan and
Paulsen have explained, this evidence is often quite persuasive for original-public-meaning
textualists, because, among other things, it can help to illustrate the way in which “informed
eighteenth-century Americans understood and used the language of the Constitution.” Kesavan
& Paulsen, supra note 2, at 1187.
297. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 580–81 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(relying on The Federalist to articulate the actual intentions and understandings of the Framers);
U.S. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 863 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing a speech made by John Jay at
the New York ratifying convention). This evidence is more important to original understanding
than it is to original intent or original objective textual meaning. See supra notes 44–70, 252 and
accompanying text.
298. See, e.g., Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 502–03 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(relying on cases decided shortly after the Framing). This evidence is of greatest value in the
search for original expected application. See supra notes 57–63 and accompanying text.
299. See, e.g., Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452, 492 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (relying on several dictionary definitions for support). Dictionaries are the
bread and butter of original public meaning textualism. See Barnett, supra note 5, at 621 (“[It]
can be very disappointing for critics of originalism—and especially for historians—when they
read original meaning analysis. They expect to see a richly detailed legislative history only to
find references to dictionaries . . . .”).
300. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 360 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (“Unfortunately, we have no record of discussions of anonymous
political expression either in the First Congress, which drafted the Bill of Rights, or in the state
ratifying conventions. Thus, our analysis must focus on the practices and beliefs held by the
Founders concerning anonymous political articles and pamphlets.”).
301. SCOTT DOUGLAS GERBER, FIRST PRINCIPLES: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF CLARENCE
THOMAS 193 (1999).
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Framers would have interpreted it. Thus, explains Gerber, “Justice
Thomas appeals to the ideal of equality at the heart of the
Declaration of Independence when he decides questions involving
race, but to the Framers’ specific intentions—as manifested in the text
and historical context of the Constitution—when he decides questions
303
involving civil liberties and federalism.” This allows him to reject
304
segregation and affirmative action, even though the framers of the
305
Fourteenth Amendment likely would have accepted them, while at
the same time relying on the narrow understanding of the Framers to
reach politically conservative results in cases involving other issues,
306
such as the establishment of religion and abortion. It appears that
his strong personal feelings about race, shaped by his own life
307
experience, have led him to adopt a different jurisprudence for race
308
But because both
cases than for other constitutional cases.
jurisprudences can lay claim to the originalist label, Justice Thomas
can shift back and forth between them all the while insisting that
“[s]trict adherence to [the originalist] approach is essential if we are
to fulfill our constitutionally assigned role of giving full effect to the
mandate of the Framers without infusing the constitutional fabric
309
with our own political views.”
302. Id. at 47 n.*.
303. Id. at 193.
304. See id. at 193–94 (citing Adarand Construction, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), as an
example of Justice Thomas’s position on affirmative action, and Justice Thomas’s comments
about Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1953), as an example of his position on
segregation); Book Note, Justice Thomas’s Inconsistent Originalism, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1431,
1435–36 (2008) (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)).
305. See Michael J. Klarman, Response, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A
Response to Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881, 1884–914 (1995) (arguing that the
original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment did not invalidate segregation);
Rubenfeld, supra note 203, at 429–32 (1997) (arguing that race-conscious Reconstruction
programs show that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not understand it to
preclude affirmative action); Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative History of
the Fourteenth Amendment, 71 VA. L. REV. 753, 754–83 (1985) (same).
306. See GERBER, supra note 301, at 193 (citing Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, 515
U.S. 819 (1995), as an example of Justice Thomas’s position on the Establishment Clause); Book
Note, supra note 304, at 1435–36 (citing Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000), as an example
of Justice Thomas’s position on abortion).
307. See generally CLARENCE THOMAS, MY GRANDFATHER’S SON: A MEMOIR (2007)
(describing the role of race in his life).
308. See Book Note, supra note 304, at 1435 (arguing that “this framework appears resultsdriven, a sort of racial exception to his generally conservative originalism, seeming to reflect
little more than Justice Thomas’s policy preferences and his desire to remain true to his view of
racial equality”).
309. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 367 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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We do not mean to suggest that these judges have consciously
and consistently acted opportunistically in deploying different
310
versions of originalism to different constitutional questions. And,
we suppose, it remains theoretically possible for a conscientious and
principled judge to select one version of originalism and consistently
apply it. But the fact that originalist judges can (and, it seems, do),
even at the subconscious level, choose among these versions—and in
doing so produce different results than they would have produced had
they chosen a different version of originalism—suggests that
originalists’ claims that originalism is likely to be overwhelmingly
better than its alternatives at constraining judicial discretion are
substantially overblown.
CONCLUSION
Originalists’ ubiquitous claim that they subscribe to a uniquely
coherent theory has until now gone largely unchallenged. The reality,
as we have explained, is substantially more complex. There are
important differences among originalists about the proper way to
interpret the Constitution—differences that undermine the rhetorical
and normative claims that underlie much of the originalist enterprise.

310. Our focus here is on judges, because it is their actions that originalists claim their
approach can constrain. It is worth noting, however, that even academic originalists—who have
the luxury of opining in the abstract, without having to issue opinions with the force of law—
have not always escaped the charge of employing inconsistent versions of originalism. For
instance, Randy Barnett, who is a political libertarian, has claimed that originalism essentially
yields the conclusion that the Constitution is a libertarian charter. See BARNETT, supra note 79,
at 356. But, according to Steven Calabresi, he does so only by selectively varying the version of
originalism that he employs in interpreting different constitutional provisions. See Calabresi,
supra note 45, at 1083–88 (arguing that Barnett arrives at his libertarian originalism only by
inconsistently employing a low-level-of-generality version of originalism in interpreting
constitutional provisions granting powers to the federal government, and a high-level-ofgenerality originalism in interpreting constitutional provisions affording rights to individuals).
Ironically (and perhaps tellingly), Calabresi himself has been criticized by other originalists for
being imprecise and inconsistent in his articulation and application of originalism. See Kesavan
& Paulsen, supra note 2, at 1142 & n.99 (noting that Calabresi and his coauthor Saikrishna
Prakash are sometimes “a bit more imprecise in their description of originalism,” insofar as they
claim at different points in the same article to seek both the objective understanding of a
hypothetical ratifier and the actual understandings of the actual ratifiers). Compare Calabresi &
Lawson, supra note 64, at 1002–03 (employing an “originalist methodology that looks to the
objective meaning of the Constitution that would have been held by a hypothetical reasonable
observer in 1788”), with Calabresi, supra note 45, at 1081 (“[W]hat really matters in
constitutional interpretation is . . . what the original language actually meant to those who used
the terms in question.” (emphasis added)).

COLBY & SMITH IN FINAL

306

10/6/2009 6:28:37 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 59:239

We imagine that many committed originalists would respond to
this Article by asserting, as has Justice Scalia, that originalism’s
normative claims still carry force because, although there are some
differences among originalists about their methodology, originalism
“by and large represents a coherent approach, or at least an agreed311
upon point of departure.” But this grossly understates the level of
disagreement among originalists. As we have endeavored to show,
originalism does not “by and large” represent a coherent approach.
And because the shared principles that can be said to animate all of
its various iterations are remarkably broad, it is an “agreed-upon
point of departure” only in the way that Chicago’s O’Hare Airport is
a point of departure: because there are so many flights on so many
airlines to so many different places, you can use it to get virtually
anywhere you want to go.
Originalists thus find themselves in something of a bind. They
312
can assert, as Lawrence Solum has suggested, that more than one,
or perhaps even all, originalist theories are legitimate—that is to say,
that the underlying principles shared by all originalist theories are
essential to a legitimate constitutional theory, but that one can
employ a number of distinct legitimate theories derived from those
principles. But that assertion undercuts the core normative claims of
many originalists that originalism is uniquely consistent with law and
313
democracy and is uniquely capable of constraining judges. If all that
originalism entails is agreement on a point of departure that can still
take judges wherever they want to go, then it surely fails to live up to
its lofty claims and promises. One cannot take the position that
multiple iterations of originalism are legitimate while simultaneously
touting originalism’s unique fidelity to law, democracy, and judicial
constraint.
Alternatively, originalists can assert, as many of them explicitly
have done, that only one particular brand of originalism is legitimate.

311. Scalia, supra note 2, at 855.
312. See Lawrence B. Solum, Colby and Smith on Originalism (and a Comment About the
Meaning of Originalism), LEGAL THEORY BLOG, Feb. 15, 2008, http://lsolum.typepad.
com/legaltheory/2008/02/thomas-colby-an.html (arguing that there is a core of originalist beliefs
that tie all versions of originalism together); Lawrence B. Solum, Incorporation and Originalist
Theory 1 (Ill. Pub. Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 08-16, 2009),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1346453 (“Originalism is best viewed as a family of theories
that characteristically affirm . . . [t]he Fixation Thesis . . . [and] [t]he Contribution Thesis . . . .”).
313. See supra Part III.B–C.

COLBY & SMITH IN FINAL

2009]

10/6/2009 6:28:37 PM

LIVING ORIGINALISM

307

314

But that assertion, as we have explained, undercuts not only the
facile “it-takes-a-theory-to-beat-a-theory” argument, but also the
notion that originalism is obviously and self-evidently correct. Finally,
one might contend that all (or at least most) iterations of originalism
are legitimate, but that true legitimacy requires a judge to choose one
version and follow it faithfully. But picking and sticking to one
particular originalist methodology appears to be much harder in
practice than it is in theory; judges have not done particularly well on
this score.
Perhaps our account will aid originalists by informing or
reminding them that “originalism” is a broad tent and that, to gain
the professed benefits of an originalist approach, they need to be
substantially more disciplined and consistent in distinguishing among
originalist theories. But one wonders whether the temptation to drift
subconsciously among originalisms in order to reach desired results
will in fact prove to be insurmountable. Perhaps the true lure of
originalism lies in its ability to allow judges to claim the interpretive
high ground by purporting to be bound by objective historical
meaning, while at the same time giving the judges the wiggle room to
reach, whether consciously or not, the results that they desire and
demand. If that is so, then much of the originalists’ case for their
theory collapses.
315
Originalism, it turns out, is not just a work in progress. It is in
fact a loose collection of a staggering array of often inconsistent
approaches to constitutional interpretation. And the approaches
themselves continue to change and evolve, sometimes too fast for
anyone to keep up. Originalists might despise the notion of a “living
constitution,” but they have gone a long way toward creating a living
constitutionalism of their own—the very existence of which
undermines much of their own rhetorical and normative claims to
superiority.

314. See supra Part III.A–B.
315. Cf. Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 2, at 1127 (“[O]riginalism as a theory of
constitutional interpretation is still trying to work itself pure—and it is not there yet.”).

